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A considerable progress has been made in recent years in verification of arith-
metic circuits such as multipliers, fused multiply-adders, multiply-accumulate, and
other components of arithmetic datapaths, both in integer and finite field domain.
However, the verification of hardware dividers and square-root functions have received
only a limited attention from the verification community, with a notable exception
for theorem provers and other inductive, non-automated systems. Division, square
root, and transcendental functions are all tied to the basic Intel architecture and
proving correctness of such algorithms is of grave importance. Although belonging to
the same iterative-subtract class of architectures, they widely differ from each other.
IEEE floating point standard specifies square-rooting and division as basic arithmetic
operation alongside the usual three basic operations. The difficulty of formally veri-
fying hardware implementation of a divider/square-root can be attributed mostly to
iv
the modeling of its characteristic function and the high memory complexity required
by standard algebraic approach.
The work proposed in this thesis discusses formal verification of combinational
divider and square-root circuits. Specifically, it addresses the problem of formally
verifying gate-level circuits using an algebraic model. In contrast to standard veri-
fication approaches using satisfiability (SAT) or equivalence checking, the proposed
method verifies whether the gate-level circuit actually performs the intended func-
tion or not, without a need for a reference design. Firstly, we present a verification
methodology for a constant divider, where the divisor value is fixed to a constant in-
teger. Albeit simpler case of verification, it provides us with the basic understanding
of verification techniques and the underlying issues applicable to divider verification.
Secondly, a layered verification approach is proposed for the verification of generic ar-
ray dividers. Finally, the work proposed in this thesis will further analyze the divider
and square-root circuits and aim to curb the memory explosion issue experienced by
computer algebra based verification methods in order to successfully verify large bit-
width divider-type arithmetic circuits. More specifically, a novel idea of ”hardware
rewriting” is introduced, which avoids the high memory complexity. The mentioned
technique verifies a 256-bit gate-level square-root circuit with around 260,000 gates
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1.1 VLSI Design Flow
What is hardware verification and more specifically, why is it important? Before
we answer these questions, we need to understand the basic design flow of Very Large
Scale Integrated circuits. Figure 1.1 shows the VLSI design flow, with the functional
verification stage shown.
Figure 1.1: VLSI design flow
The design flow begins with an initial system-level specification written using a
programming language, which can either be software (C, C++) or hardware language
(Verilog, VHDL, etc.). This specification entails the functional behavior of the design,
which is then converted into a register-transfer-level (RTL) description and translated
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into Boolean expression for individual logic blocks and the interconnections logic by
a process called synthesis. Synthesis is a process that maps the logic expressions
of the design/circuit onto a gate-level netlist. Different optimization goals can be
considered at this point to optimize the design for parameters, such as area, delay or
power minimization, depending upon the target application and technology (ASIC
or FPGA). Finally, the layout design tools, such as Cadence Encounter are used
to perform physical synthesis, also known as place and route. Final sign-off of the
design includes an extensively thorough verification before the circuit is sent out
for fabrication. Many Electronic Design Automaton (EDA) tools provide seamless
integration between all these steps and verify the functional correctness of the design
between consecutive steps.
1.2 Hardware Verification
The main idea of these verification checks is to make sure that the specifica-
tion of the design gets properly and accurately translated from previous state to the
next and, ultimately, into a physical design without any errors. With contemporary
processors containing over two billion transistors, it is imminent to employ design ver-
ification strategies to catch and correct the errors before the circuit gets fabricated on
a physical chip. These multi-billion transistor chips can be generally sub-divided into
datapath operators, memory unit, control unit, and other special purpose modules.
Datapath operators are the main workhorses of computer systems, doing all the com-
putations; they include arithmetic operations such as adders, subtractors, multipliers,
dividers, square-rooters, etc. With an ongoing quest for minimum-area, high-speed
and power-efficient design of these operators, these circuits/designs undergo several
periodic improvements and optimizations. This consistent evolution demands a need
for an efficient and consistent verification. Given the large input bit-width of these
operators, enumerating the solution space by performing exhaustive simulation is sim-
2
ply infeasible. Hence, modern symbolic verification techniques (formal verification)
are used to reason about the solution-sets without actually enumerating them. In
this work, we use computer algebra techniques, which can reason about the solution
space at both, the bit- and word-level, and naturally possess the required power of
abstraction. Specifically, we target the functional verification of gate-level arithmetic
designs (net-lists), and more specifically, dividers and square-rooters. Other kinds of
hardware verification, such as model/property checking, physical verification, timing
verification, clock domain crossing (CDC) verification, etc., are not subject of this
work.
1.2.1 Canonical Diagrams
Binary decision diagrams (BDDs) [4] and all other variants BMDs [3], TEDs [8]
etc. are data structures for representing Boolean functions, i.e., functions that take
Boolean variables as input and produce Boolean outputs. Truth tables have been used
to enumerate the logic described by a boolean function. However, truth tables require
exhaustive enumeration, and are not memory efficient. Whereas, canonical diagrams,
evolving from the Shannon expression, are compact graphs, where logic functions
are encoded in graph paths efficiently, and some variants of BDDs are actually very
efficient in crawling through the solution space of a Boolean function, addressing
functional verification and equivalence checking of different arithmetic designs. These
canonical diagrams are efficient to some degree in solving also arithmetic circuits,
such as adders, subtractors, and multipliers. However, this representation has its
limitations. Since the size of these diagrams increases exponentially with the size of
bit-width, BDDs become prohibitive for larger designs and specifically for arithmetic
circuits. Even though BDDs have been used to verify adders/subtractors [52] and
to some extent multipliers [7], [23], the literature is rather scarce on verification
of divider circuits. A notable exception in this domain is the work of Bryant [5].
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Although, effective and being able to catch the infamous Pentium 4 floating point
division bug, it requires generating a checker circuit, which itself needs to be proved.
However, no reliable means were offered for the verification of the checker circuit
itself.
1.2.2 SAT: Satisfiability Problem
In order to overcome the shortcomings of canonical diagram based verification,
SAT (short for satisfiability) has emerged as a leading technique in Formal Verifica-
tion. The main goal of SAT based verification is to find satisfying assignments to a
formula, hence the name SAT. Typically, the formula is in the form of Cunjunctive
Normal Form (CNF), a conjunction of one or more clauses, where a clause is a dis-
junction of literals. For example, the Boolean formula ϕ = (a + ¬b)(¬a + ¬b + c)
can be satisfied by choosing a = 1; b = 1; c = 1 , which makes ϕ = 1, and hence
provides a satisfiable solution. If the assignment of variables that makes the Boolean
formula ϕ = 1 does not exist, the problem is called unsatisfiable or unSAT.
Since the seminal 1962 paper of Davis, Putnam, Logemann and Loveland [12],
their DPLL algorithm has become a predominant algorithm to solve SAT instances.
It is based on an intelligent space searching with a basic backtracking capability.
Variables are selected according to some heuristic and assigned value 0 or 1. The
newly assigned constants are propagated to the unsatisfied clauses by the process
called Boolean Constraint Propagation (BCP) to identify implications, conflicts, and
the satisfied clauses. An important enhancement to the basic DPLL algorithm is a
Conflict-Driven Clause Learning (CDCL), which provides ability to learn new clauses
that prevents the space search process from ending in an unsatisfying assignment. It
also adds non-chronological backtracking from which a new search continues. Modern
software SAT solvers are equipped with an efficient BCP, conflict resolution strategies,
4
and an improved decision heuristic that can rapidly and efficiently prune the search
space.
However, regardless of all these innovations and developments, the SAT-based
methods have a low scalability in verifying arithmetic circuits. For example, a state-
of-art SAT solver, miniSAT [44], takes up to an hour to verify a 16-bit multiplier.
Furthermore, it takes several hours to verify a 17-bit divider circuit. This is not an
effective verification methodology since the current multiplication and divider units
in core datapath are usually 32-bit or 64-bit wide. Hence, we need an effective and
efficient methodology to verify these essential datapath operators.
1.2.3 Theorem Proving
The technique that received most attention in industry in arithmetic circuit ver-
ification is Theorem Proving. In this technique, the circuit is characterized by
a set of rules, which are used to make complex formulas to represent the circuit
[39][27][24][25][26]. However, the process of converting a circuit into a predefined set
of rules to be applied sequentially requires a significant human effort and an intimate
knowledge of the domain. The success of the proof relies on the choice of, and on
the order in which the rules are applied, with no guarantee of a successful conclusion.
Rager et al. [36] report that proving that the divider implemented by ORACLE is
formally proven as equivalent of the SPARC ISA and IEEE 754 specifications, re-
quired ”a sizable effort”. Furthermore, these approaches cannot be fully automated
or generalized. Regardless of these techniques, there is still a need to formally verify





This chapter provides a mathematical background of computer algebra method
presented in this work and reviews the related work in the literature. This and the
next chapter is written in collaboration with my colleague Tiankai Su [45] and is
presented as a joint work to serve as a brief summary of computer algebraic back-
ground. Specifically, in order to build an algebraic model for an arithmetic circuit in
the context of computer algebra, the following concepts are need to be revised: fields,
polynomials, ideals, varieties and ideal membership, and Gro¨bner basis.
2.1 Fields, Polynomials, Ideals and Varieties
2.1.1 Fields
In mathematics, a field is a set F , containing at least two elements, on which two
operations + and · (called addition and multiplication, respectively) are defined, so
that for each pair of elements x, y ∈ F there are unique elements x + y and x · y in
F . A field is thus a fundamental algebraic structure, which is widely used in algebra,
number theory, and many other areas of mathematics. To learn about fields, we start
with the commutative ring, since field is a special class of ring. A commutative ring
consists of a set R and two binary operations ”·” and ”+” defined on R, for which
the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) Associativity: (a+ b) + c = a+ (b+ c) and (a · b) · c = a · (b · c) for all a, b, c,∈ R.
(ii) Commutativity: a+ b = b+ a and a · b = b · a for all a, b ∈ R.
(iii) Distributivity: a · (b+ c) = a · b+ a · c for all a, b, c ∈ R.
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(iv) Identities: There are elements 0, 1 ∈ R such that a + 0 = a and a · 1 = a for all
a ∈ R.
(v) Additive inverse: Given a ∈ R, there is b ∈ R such that a+ b = 0.
Two examples of commutative rings are the integers Z and the polynomial ring
k[x1,...,xn], with coefficients in an arbitrary field k. A field F is a commutative ring
with unity, where every element in F, except 0, has a multiplicative inverse: ∀ a
∈ (F − {0}),∃ aˆ ∈ F such that a · aˆ = 1. The most commonly used fields are Q, R
and C. The set Z, which is of particular interest to us, is a ring but not a field, since
it does not have the attribution of a multiplicative inverse.
2.1.2 Polynomials
A polynomial is an expression consisting of variables and coefficients that involves
the operations of addition, multiplication, and non-negative integer exponents of vari-
ables. In general, a polynomial f in variables x1,...,xn is a finite linear combination
of monomials, with coefficients in some field k. A polynomial can always be written




i , where each product x
αi
i is called monomial
and ai is the coefficient. A monomial in variables x1,...,xn is a product of the form
xα11 · xα22 · · · xαnn , where all of the exponents α1,...,αn are nonnegative integers. The
degree of this monomial is the sum α1 + · · · + αn. The total degree of polynomial
f , denoted deg(f), is the maximum degree among all the monomials. A term of f is
the product of a nonzero coefficient and its monomial. As an example, polynomial
f = 2x3y2z + 2
3
y3z3 − 3xyz + y2 has four terms and total degree six. Note that there
are two terms of maximal total degree, which is something that cannot happen for
polynomials in one variable.
There are several ways to order monomials (referred to as term order), such as
lexicographic order (LEX), Degree reverse lexicographic order (DEGREVLEX), and
others. For instance, in LEX order, 2x3y2z > 2
3
y3z3. The first, or greatest term of f
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(in terms of the adapted term order), is called the leading term lt(f) of the polynomial
f . In the above example, the leading term is 2x3y2z.
Leading terms play an important role in the proposed verification method, where
logic gates of a circuit are described as polynomials. Specifically, the polynomial
terms are ordered such that the leading term is a variable representing an output
of a gate. This ordering makes a profound impact on the efficiency of the proposed
verification technique. This issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
In this work, since all variables representing in the circuits are Boolean, we are
particularly interested in polynomials with variables of degree 1. Such a polynomial is
called Pseudo-Boolean polynomial. Formally, a Pseudo-Boolean function is a function
f : Bn → R, where B = {0, 1} is a Boolean domain and n is a nonnegative integer









aijkxixjxk + . . .
with constant coefficients a, ai, ... in the given field.
2.1.3 Ideals and Varieties
Given a polynomial ring R = k[x1,...,xn] with coefficients in some field k, a subset
I ⊂ R is an ideal if it satisfies:
(i) 0 ∈ I. (ii) If f, g ∈ I , then f + g ∈ I. (iii) If f ∈ I and h ∈ R, then hf ∈ I.
In general, if I ∈ k[x1,...,xn] consists of all the linear combinations of a set of
polynomials {f1, ..., fs} ∈ k[x1,...,xn], then I is an ideal of the set {f1, ..., fs}, and the
set of {fi} is called generator or basis.
J = 〈f1, ..., fs〉 = h1f1 + ...+ hsfs : hi ∈ R (2.1)
We call 〈f1, ..., fs〉 the ideal generated by the basis {f1, ..., fs}.
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Given an ideal J = 〈f1, ..., fs〉 generated by f1, ..., fs,∈ k[x1, ..., xd], the set of all
solutions to: f1 = f2 = · · · = fs = 0 is called variety V (f1, ..., fs) of J . While
an ideal may have different bases, the variety depends only on the ideal and not on
the basis (generator). That is, different bases that produce the same ideal will have
exactly the same variety. In Section 2.3, we will introduce an especially useful basis
for our verification, called Gro¨bner basis.
Let {f1, ..., fs} and {g1, ..., gt} be the bases of the same ideal in k[x1,...,xn], i.e.
〈f1, ..., fs〉 = 〈g1, ..., gt〉; then V (f1, ..., fs) = V (g1, ..., gt). In the next section, we will
show how the concept of ideal and variety is applied to circuit verification.
2.2 Ideal Membership Test
The symbolic algebra theories about polynomial rings, ideals and varieties we use
in this work are all defined over a field, typically Q. However, as described next and
fully developed in the next section, the polynomials introduced in our work represent
logic gates and are defined over ring Z. However, these polynomials have a special
structure, namely their leading term lt(fi) that represents a variable associated with
a logic gate gi has coefficient 1. Subsequently, the process of polynomial division,
which is an essential element of the verification process (to be described in detail
later), will never introduce any coefficient outside of Z. Consequently, this allows us
to treat the polynomials as if they were in Q.
Let B = {f1, ...fs}, with fi ∈ Z[X], be a set of polynomials representing the
circuit elements and let the ideal J = 〈f1, ..., fs〉 be generated by basis {f1, ..., fs}. In
our case, each generator is a polynomial model of a circuit module (logic gate), and
the set of generators can be viewed as the implementation of the circuit. Then, from
the circuit perspective, the variety V (J) of J , which is the set of all simultaneous
solutions to a system of equations f1(x1, ..., xn) = 0; ..., fs(x1, ..., xn) = 0, contains all
signal values of the circuit for all possible input valuations {xi}.
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Similarly, functional specification of the circuit is also defined as a polynomial in
Z[X], where X is a set of input and output variables. For example, the specification
of a multiplier circuit, Z = A ·B, can then be written as a polynomial F : Z −A ·B.
Here, A,B, and Z are symbolic, word-level variables, each represented as a polynomial
in their respective bit-level variables, e.g., A =
∑n−1
i=0 2
iai, and similarly for B and
Z. In terms of computer algebra, the arithmetic circuit verification problem is then
formulated as follows [34][30][41][38]:
Given a circuit represented by a set of generators (implementation), B = {f1, ..., fs},
and the specification F , the goal of functional verification is to prove that the im-
plementation (B) satisfies the specification (F ). Here, B have the same notation as
in the previous example, but it represents a set of gate polynomials. This means
that for a functionally correct circuit, the solution to F = 0 agrees with V (J), or,
equivalently, that F vanishes on V (J)1. Consequently, this problem has been termed
as an ideal membership test, which decides whether the specification polynomial F is
a member of the ideal J generated by B, i.e., if F ∈ J [18][34][30].
Given an ideal J = 〈f1, ..., fs〉, in order to test if F ∈ J , polynomial F is divided
consecutively by f1, ..., fs. The goal of each division is to cancel the leading term of F
(with respect to a chosen term order) using one of the leading terms of f1, ..., fs. Such
a reduction results in a polynomial remainder r = F − lt(F )
lt(fi)
· fi, in which the leading
term lt(F ) has been canceled. If the remainder r reduces to zero, the implementation
satisfies the specification. However, if r 6= 0, such a conclusion cannot be drawn: r
can still be in J but it is not divisible by any of the polynomials in B = {f1, ..., fs}.
That is, the basis B = {f1, ..., fs} may not be sufficient to reduce F −→ 0, and yet
the circuit may be correct. To check if F is reducible to zero for the given ideal J , one
must compute a canonical set of generators, G = {p1, ..., pt}, called the Gro¨bner basis,
1Polynomial f is said to vanish on a set V if ∀a ∈ V f(a) = 0. Or, V (f) ⊆ V (J).
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with the same ideal 〈p1, ..., pt〉 = 〈f1, ..., fs〉, the set G = {p1, ..., pt} be the Gro¨bner
basis for ideal J , then F belongs to J if and only if the remainder of the division of
F by the elements of G is zero, denoted as ∀F ∈ J , F G−→+ 0 [1]. The sign + means
that the division/reduction is done consecutively by using the elements of G one by
one. In short, the Gro¨bner basis is necessary to unequivocally answer the question
whether F ∈ J .
2.3 Gro¨bner basis
A basis {p1, ..., pt} of an ideal J〈p1, ..., pt〉 is called a Gro¨bner basis (w.r.t. the
monomial order >) if the leading term of every nonzero element of J is a multiple of
(at least) one of the leading term lt(p1), ..., lt(pt). A known algorithmic procedure for
computing a Gro¨bner basis is called Buchberger’s algorithm [6]. Given some basis B =
{f1, ..., fs}, it produces another basisG = {p1, ..., pt}, such that the ideals 〈p1, ..., pt〉 =
〈f1, ..., ft〉 and hence have the same variety V (〈G〉) = V (〈B〉). Buchberger’s algorithm
is computationally expensive, since it computes the so-called S-polynomials (SPoly) by
performing reduction operations on all pairs of polynomials in B. The S-polynomial





g, where L is the least common multiple LCM(lm(p), lm(g)). Note that
Spoly(p, g) cancels the leading terms of p and g, and the remainder r obtained in
Spoly(p, g) F
P−→+ r gives a new leading term.
The basic purpose of computing SPoly pairs is to compute polynomials with new
leading terms, which can be used in the reduction step of the ideal-membership test-
ing. These newly generated polynomials belong to the ideal G which completely
defines the system. To compute Gro¨bner basis G = {g1, ..., gl} for an ideal 〈p1, ..., pt〉,
Buchberger’s algorithm computes G in some finite number of steps by performing the
Spoly(p, g)
P−→+ r iteratively. The algorithm determines if Spoly(p, g) P−→+ 0. In
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this case, we also conclude that all polynomials are relatively prime to each other,
with a distinct leading term.
This establishes that the generating set (generator) whose polynomials are rela-
tively prime to each other is in fact a Grobner basis. This important fact will be
used in developing the verification method in the upcoming sections. A number of
other algorithms have been developed for computing a Gro¨bner basis, such as F4 [17],
which in contrast to the basic Buchberger’s algorithm, compute multiple SPoly pairs
in each iteration. However, in general, the process of generating a Gro¨bner remains
computationally expensive.
2.4 Related Work
The work in arithmetic circuit verification was pioneered by Shekhar et al. [43]
and Wienand et al. [47], where some important concepts from computer algebra
and algebraic geometry were applied to model the core verification problem. In [47]
an arithmetic circuit is modeled as a network of arithmetic operators, such as half-
and full-adders, comparators, and product generators, extracted from the gate-level
implementation. These operators are modeled using arithmetic bit-level (ABL) ex-
pressions, B = {Bj}. The authors of [47] (and also of [30]) show that for an arbitrary
combinational circuit, if the terms of the gate equations B are ordered in reverse topo-
logical order, {outputs} > {inputs}, then all leading monomials of the polynomials
in B are relatively prime. As a result, the corresponding set B already constitutes a
Gro¨bner basis (GB), obviating the computation of the complete canonical Gro¨bner
basis. The verification problem is solved by reducing the specification F modulo B
to the normal form and testing if it vanishes over Z2n . The restriction to binary
variables is achieved by imposing Boolean constraints, 〈x2 − x〉 for all the variable
x [34], and the problem is solved over quotient ring Q = Z2n [X]/〈x2 − x〉 (for all
variable x) using a popular computer algebra system, Singular [15]. This approach,
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however, is limited to circuits composed entirely of half adders and full adders, which
must first be extracted from the gate-level implementation. In practice, this is the
most expensive part of the process, and it is not always possible to perform such
extraction, especially in highly bit-optimized implementations.
In [30] the verification problem was similarly formulated as an ideal membership
test but applied to Galois Field (GF or F2q) arithmetic circuits. It has been shown
that in GF, when the specification F and the ideal J of the circuit implementation
are in F2q , the problem can be reduced to testing if F ∈ (J + J0), over a larger ideal
(J + J0) where J0 = 〈x2− x〉 is an ideal of the field polynomials. Adding J0 basically
restricts the variety V to solutions in F2, i.e. to V (J) ∩ V (J0) [11]. The polynomials
of J0 are referred to as field polynomials. Similarly to [47], the authors of [30] derive
the term order from the topological structure of the circuit, which renders the set
of polynomials B (circuit implementation) a Gro¨bner basis (GB), thus obviating the
need to perform the expensive GB computation. The method uses a customized,
F4-style polynomial reduction using a modified Gaussian elimination algorithm [17]
under this term order.
A different approach to that of defined earlier has been proposed in [51], whereby
the expensive polynomial reduction process has been replaced by a computationally
simpler algebraic rewriting technique. The method introduces the concept of an input
signature, a polynomial in the primary inputs, and an output signature, a polynomial
derived from the encoding of the primary outputs. The verification is accomplished
by rewriting the output signature, using algebraic expressions of the internal gates,
into an input signature. This process de facto performs function extraction. Several
ordering techniques have been described to make this method applicable to large
arithmetic circuits, but the method still cannot handle the heavily optimized circuits.
A similar approach to arithmetic circuit verification, called backward construction,
was proposed in 1995 in [23]. It uses BMDs to reconstruct functional, high level
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representation from the gate-level structure of arithmetic circuits such as adders and
multipliers. Experimental results show that time complexity of the tested circuits is
in the order of n4 for multipliers with n bit operands. There is no clear indication if
the BMD is an efficient data structure for this problem, and our experiments could
not confirm its efficiency.
The basic approach of the ideal membership testing and Gro¨bner basis (GB)
reduction has also been used in the works of [41][38], where it was applied to integer
circuits. In [41] the following features have been added to make the reduction more
efficient:
• Logic reduction with an AND-XOR vanishing rule, which analyzes the structure
of the circuit to identify and remove vanishing monomials that correspond to
the product of XOR, AND signals with shared input variables;
• An XOR rewriting scheme, which reduces the model of the circuit to consider
only primary inputs, outputs, and fan-out points/XOR gates; and
• Common rewriting, which eliminates the nodes with a single parent. These
techniques simplify the task of GB reduction by eliminating all the nodes which
have exactly one parent, thus increasing the chance for early term cancellation
during the rewriting process.
Another work [38] revisits the techniques from [51] and [41] and provides the proof of
correctness for these approaches. It uses a column-wise technique to model and verify
basic multiplier structures by computing the Gro¨bner basis incrementally for each
column of the output bit, rather than for the entire circuit. The work is concluded by
showing the efficacy of the technique by applying it to clean and ”dirty”, i.e., heavily
optimized, multipliers. The paper justifies the use of the theory of ideal membership
(in principle applicable to Q[X]) to prove properties of integer arithmetic circuits in
Z. It points out that, since the leading coefficients of the gate polynomials forming
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the Gro¨bner basis are +1 or -1, polynomial reduction never introduces fractional
coefficients and their computation remains in Z. This also explains why the dedicated
implementations in [51] and [41] can rely on computation in Z only, while remaining
sound and complete [38]. A follow-up paper [37] describes an enhancement to this
column-wise technique by extracting half- and full-adder constraints to further reduce
the size of Gro¨bner basis to speed up the reduction process.
In general, the problem of formally verifying complex integer arithmetic circuits
(not just multipliers) remains open, and new solutions are being proposed. In the next
chapter, an efficient and scalable approach, called algebraic rewriting, is introduced
to address this issue. This approach has already been proposed by our group earlier,
but it is further refined and formalized in this dissertation to be adequately applied to
Divider and Square-root circuits. In addition, a bit-flow model is proposed to support
the proof of the correctness of algebraic rewriting, and to offer a new insight into the
problem of arithmetic circuit verification [9].
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CHAPTER 3
ALGEBRAIC REWRITING AND DIVIDER MODEL
This chapter introduces the algebraic model used in circuit verification, which is
the key to solve the verification problem in algebraic domain. Two flavors of computer
algebra techniques that use this model will be discussed in detail: 1) Gro¨bner basis
reduction techniques [34][41][38] and 2) algebraic rewriting [51]. Detailed algorithms
for the reduction and the rewriting are given. We analyze the relation between these
two computer algebra techniques and provide a comparison from the efficiency point
of view.
3.1 Algebraic Model of Electronic Circuits
The arithmetic circuits considered in this dissertation are the ones which can be
expressed as a polynomial in the input variables. These include adders, subtractors,
multipliers, fused add-multiply circuits, dividers, and square-root. In this Section, we
provide examples of existing solutions for multiplier verification. Later, we provide
a detailed analysis of a divider verification methodology. Such arithmetic circuits
are modeled as a network of interconnected bit-level components, each with a finite
set of binary inputs with one or more binary outputs. In this work, we will focus
on gate-level integer arithmetic circuits with single-output logic gates. However, the
model can be extended to other, more complex, multiple-output circuit components
such as dividers and square-rooters.
Each gate is modeled by a pseudo-Boolean polynomial fi ∈ Z[X], with Boolean
variables X representing circuit signals associated with a logic gate. A pseudo-
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Boolean polynomial is an integer-valued function f : {0, 1}n → Z. It is an algebraic
expression with usual multiplication and addition operators over Boolean variables.
The following expressions summarize the algebraic representation of basic Boolean
operators NOT, AND, OR and XOR.
¬a = 1− a
a ∧ b = a · b
a ∨ b = a+ b− a · b
a⊕ b = a+ b− 2a · b
(3.1)
By construction, each expression evaluates to a binary value {0,1} and hence correctly
models the Boolean function of a logic gate. Models for more complex AOI (And-Or-
Invert) gates, used in standard cell technology, are readily obtained from these basic
logic expressions. For example, the algebraic model for the logic gate
• g = a ∨ (b ∧ c) => g = a+ bc− abc
• OR3 (a ∨ b) => z = a+ b+ c− ab− ac− bc+ abc
• XOR3 (a⊕ b⊕ c) => z = a+ b+ c− 2ab− 2ac− 2bc+ 4abc
• MAJ3 (a ∧ b ∨ a ∧ c ∨ b ∧ c) => ab+ bc+ ac− 2abc
Multiple output modules, such as single-bit adders, with binary inputs can be
expressed similarly. For example, a half-adder (HA) and a full-adder (FA), can be
expressed by the following expressions:
ha : 2C + S = a+ b
fa : 2C + S = a+ b+ cin
(3.2)
where a, b, cin are binary inputs and C, S are binary outputs.
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The function computed by an arithmetic circuit is represented as a specification
polynomial in the primary input variables, denoted Fspec. For example, the specifica-
tion of an n-bit unsigned integer multiplier, Z = A ·B with inputs A = [a0, · · · , an−1]





i+jaibj. The result of
the computation, stored in the primary output bits, is also expressed as a polyno-
mial, called output signature, Sout. Typically, such a polynomial is linear, uniquely
determined by the m-bit encoding of the output, provided by the designer. For ex-




izi. The circuit is implemented as a network of logic gates G,
each modeled as a polynomial gi derived from Eqn.(3.1). The polynomial representing
a given gate evaluates to zero for all the input and output combinations satisfied by
this gate. As an example, a non-standard gate-level implementation of a full adder,
is shown in Fig. 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Gate-level arithmetic circuit (Full Adder)
The set of polynomials G = {fi} in Eqn. 3.3 represents the gate-level implementa-
tion of the full adder circuit. We refer to this set as G to indicate that it is a Gro¨bner
basis (or GB for short). It has been shown that if the polynomials in G are ordered
such that the leading term is the output of the gate, and the leading term of all the
polynomials are relatively prime, the set G forms Gro¨bner basis [35].
The set G consists of two parts: gate polynomials (f1, ..., f8) and field polynomials
(f9, ..., f17). Each polynomial satisfies the relation fi = 0. The gate polynomials
have the form fi = vi − tail(fi), where the leading term lt(fi) = vi is the output of
18
gate fi, and tail(fi) is the logic specification of the gate in terms of its inputs. The
leading terms under such ordering are relatively prime, which renders G a Gro¨bner
basis [34][30][38]. This feature is essential for both the GB reduction and algebraic
rewriting, which will be discussed in the next sections.
f1 = p1 − (−ab+ a+ b)
f2 = g1 − (−ab+ 1)
f3 = S1 − p1g1
f4 = C1 − (−g1 + 1)
f5 = p2 − (S1c0 − S1 − c0 + 1)
f6 = g2 − S1c0
f7 = S − (p2g2 − p2 − g2 + +1)










Each field polynomials, f9, ..., f17, has the form J0 =< x
2− x >, where x is one of
the signals {a, b, c0, p1, g1, S1, C1, p2, g2}. These field polynomials play an important
role in polynomial reduction to maintain the Boolean property of each variable. How-
ever, they are handled differently in the GB reduction than in the algebraic rewriting
approach, as discussed in the next sections.
3.2 Gro¨bner Basis Polynomial Reduction
In this method the reduction of F modulo G is accomplished by successively
eliminating terms of F , one by one, by a leading term of some polynomial fi ∈ G, using
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Gaussian elimination. The reduction is performed over a Gro¨bner basis derived from
G and the field polynomials J0. From the mathematical point of view, this means that
the computation will be performed in the quotient ring, Z[X]/〈x2−x〉 : x ∈ X, the set
of all variables (signals) of the circuit. The Gro¨bner basis (GB) reduction algorithm
is given in Algorithm 1. First, the polynomial base G={f1, ..., fm} is derived from
N using Equations (3.1), where m is the number of logic components in N . Each
polynomial in G has the form fi = v + tail(fi), where v is the the leading monomial
lm(fi). All the variables in the circuit are ordered in reverse-topological order, from
primary outputs to primary inputs, and for each gate polynomial from the gate output
to its inputs.
Figure 3.2: Half-Adder gate-level arithmetic circuit
Furthermore, the output signals of the gates that depend on common variables
(fanins) should be ordered next to each other, as this will maximize the chance for a
potential term cancellation and minimize the size of intermediate polynomials. For
example, consider the reduction of a polynomial F = 2C + S + .... in a circuit
containing a half adder composed of an AND gate C = ab and an XOR gate S =
a+b−2ab, shown in Figure 3.2. Since both C and S depend on common variables, a, b,
reducing them one immediately after the other will eliminate the product term ab from
the polynomial, resulting in F = a + b + ...... This is beneficial from the complexity
point of view, and should be performed before the reduction of the remaining terms
of the polynomial.
Considering these two basic ordering rules, one possible term order for the polyno-
mial ring of the circuit in Figure 3.1 is shown below, where variables in curly brackets
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can assume any relative order.
{S,C} > {p2, g2} > {S1, C1} > {p1, g1} > {a, b, c0} (3.4)
The expression F to be reduced is initialized with the difference between the output
signature Sout and Fspec. In this case F = 2C+S− (a+ b+ c0). The goal is to reduce
F to 0 by G.
Algorithm 1 Gro¨ebner Basis Polynomial Reduction
Input: Specification polynomial Fspec;and Gate-level netlist N
Output: Remainder Rem
1: Create base G={f1,...,fm} of N using Eq.(3.1)
2: Generate Sout from N
3: Define ring and specify term order
4: Initialize F ← Sout − Fspec
5: while F 6= 0 do
6: if ∃fi ∈ G : lt(F )lt(fi) 6= 0 then
7: /* there exists fi such that its leading term is divisible by lt(F ) */
8: F ← F − lt(F )
lt(fi)
· fi // polynomial division
9: else
10: /* no leading term of fi divides F , move lt(F ) to Rem */
11: F ← F − lt(F )
12: Rem← Rem+ lt(F )
13: end if
14: Maintain the term order imposed on the ring
15: end while
16: return Rem
The main part of the GB reduction is given in lines 5-15. The algorithm searches
for a polynomial fi in G such that the leading term of fi divides the current leading
term lt(F ) of F . If such a polynomial exists, it will be used to reduce F , as shown
in line 8. Otherwise, the lt(F ) will be moved to the remainder Rem (lines 11− 12).
At any point, when new terms (containing new intermediate variables introduced by
division) are added to polynomial F (line 8), the procedure must maintain the term
order imposed on the ring. The reduction process terminates when F becomes empty,
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either by being reduced or moved to Rem. The zero remainder is the evidence of a
correct implementation, as discussed in Chapter 2.2.
We illustrate the GB reduction process with the example in Fig. 3.1. The initial
polynomial for this circuit is:
F = 2C + S − (a+ b+ c0) (3.5)
Equation (3.6) gives the sequence of steps that reduces F with the gate polyno-
mials fi ∈ G for the circuit in Figure 3.1. At each step, F represents the polynomial
reduced by the previous reduction step. For brevity, the substitution is shown for a
pair of variables at once. For example, F/(C, S) means reducing variables C and S
with polynomial f8 followed by f7. The term order given in Eqn. (3.4), imposed on
the ring, is maintained throughout the entire reduction process.
F = 2C + S − (a+ b+ c0)
1) F/( S , C ) = 2(−C1g2 + g2 + C1) + (p2g2 − p2 − g2 + 1)− (a+ b+ c0)
= p2g2 − p2 − 2g2C1 + g2 + 2C1 − (a+ b+ c0) + 1
2) F/( p2, g2 ) = (S1c0 − S1 − c0 + 1)S1c0 − (S1c0 − S1 − c0 + 1)− 2S1C1c0
+ S1c0 + 2C1 − (a+ b+ c0) + 1
= S21c
2
0 − S21c0 − S1c20 + S1c0 − 2S1C1c0 + S1 + 2C1 − (a+ b)
3) F/(S21 − S1) = −2S1C1c0 + S1 + 2C1 − (a+ b)
4) F/( S1, C1) = −2(p1g1)(−g1 + 1)c0 + p1g1 + 2(−g1 + 1)− (a+ b)
= −2(−p1g21 + p1g1)c0 + p1g1 − 2g1 − (a+ b) + 2
5) F/( g21 − g1) = p1g1 − 2g1 − (a+ b) + 2
6) F/( p1, g1 ) = (−ab+ a+ b)(−ab+ 1)− 2(−ab+ 1)− (a+ b) + 2
= a2b2 − a2b− ab2 + ab
7) F/( a2 − a) = 0
(3.6)
The effect of field polynomials J0 =< x
2 − x >, responsible for keeping each
variable Boolean, can be observed during steps 2, 4, 6 and 7, shown in bold. The
reduction terminates in Rem = 0, indicating that the circuit implements the function
indicated by the specification, a full adder.
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3.3 Algebraic Rewriting
Algebraic rewriting is the process of transforming the output signature Sout into
an input signature Sin using algebraic models of the internal components (logic gates)
of the circuit. The rewriting is done in reverse topological order: from the primary
outputs (PO) to the primary inputs (PI); for this reason it is also referred to as a
backward rewriting [51]. Intermediate expressions obtained during rewriting are also
represented as polynomials, referred to as signatures, over the variables representing
the internal signals of the circuit. By construction, each variable in a given signature
(starting with Sout) represents an output of some logic gate.
The rewriting transformation simply replaces each variable with the corresponding
algebraic expression of the logic gate. If the variable is part of a monomial involving
other variables, the expression is multiplied by the remaining terms and expanded to
a disjunctive normal form. This is followed by a standard polynomial simplification
by combining terms with same monomials.
Algorithm 2 Algebraic Rewriting
Input: Specification polynomial Fspec; and Gate-level netlist N
Output: (Sin == Fspec), or the computed signature Sin
1: Derive G={f1,...,fm} from N using Eqn.(3.1)
2: Sort G to maximize the cancellations // pre-processing
3: Generate Sout from N
4: Initialize Sig ← Sout
5: for fi in G do
6: v ← lm(fi) // leading monomial of fi is output of a gate
7: if v ∈ Sig then
8: /* replace v with tail(fi) in Sig */
9: Sig ← Sig(v ← tail(fi))
10: x← x2 // for all x in Sig
11: end if
12: end for
13: /* upon termination, Sig is composed of PIs only */
14: if Sig == Fspec return True
15: else return Sin = Sig
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Algebraic Rewriting procedure is summarized in Algorithm 2. First, the polyno-
mial base G={f1,...,fm} is derived from N using Eq.(3.1), as in the GB reduction.
Then, the polynomials in G are sorted in reverse-topological order (lines 1-2). Among
several possible topological orders the one that maximizes the number of early can-
cellations during rewriting is sought. This has an effect of minimizing the size of
the intermediate polynomials during rewriting (the ”fat belly” effect) [51]. It is ac-
complished by keeping together the polynomials whose leading terms (gate outputs)
depend on common variables, as in the GB reduction. The expression to be rewritten,
Sig, is initialized with the given output signature Sout of N (lines 3-4).
The main part of the rewriting, lines 5-12, iterates over the polynomials fi ∈ G
and performs the required substitutions. Specifically, all occurrences of v = lt(fi)
in Sig are replaced by tail(fi), followed by possible expansion of the resulting term.
To maintain Boolean values of the variables during rewriting, the degree of each
variable in Sig is reduced to 1 (line 10). This step is equivalent to dividing Sig by
a field polynomial < x2 − x >, but it is achieved in a more efficient way. At the
end, the algorithm returns Sin as the derived signature of the circuit. If the terms of
polynomials in G are sorted in a reversed topological order, the returned polynomial
Sin contains only the primary input (PI) variables, so it can be compared with Fspec.
While the main goal of algebraic rewriting, as described by Algorithm 2, is to
determine the arithmetic function implemented by the circuit, it can also be used
to verify it against the known specification. This can be simply done by rewriting
F = Sout − Fspec and checking if it produces a zero. We will use this rewriting mode
in order to compare it against the GB reduction method in Chapter 3.2.
We illustrate the rewriting process using the example of the gate-level full-adder
circuit in Figure 3.1. The output signature of the circuit is Sout = 2C+S, determined
by the binary encoding of the output. The specification for this circuit Fspec =
a+b+c0. Following the ordering rules described in [51], the best rewriting order which
24
F = 2C + S − (a+ b+ c0)
1) F/(S, C ) = 2(C1 + g2 − C1g2) + (1− (p2 + g2 − p2g2))− (a+ b+ c0)
= 2C1 + g2 − 2C1g2 − p2 + p2g2 + 1− (a+ b+ c0)
2) F/(p2, g2) = 2C1 + S1c0 − 2S1C1c0 − (1− (S1 + c0 − S1c0))
+ (1− (S1 + c0 − S1c0))S1c0 + 1− (a+ b+ c0)
= 2C1 − 2S1C1c0 + S1 + S1c0 − S21c0 − S1c20 + S21c20 − (a+ b)
= 2C1 − 2S1C1 + S1 − (a+ b)
3) F/(S1, C1) = 2(1− g1)− 2(1− g1)(p1g1)c0 + p1g1 − (a+ b)
= 2− 2g1 − 2(p1g1 − p1g21) + p1g1 − (a+ b)
= 2− 2g1 + p1g1 − (a+ b)
4) F/(p1, g1) = 2− 2(1− ab) + (a+ b− ab)(1− ab)− (a+ b)
= ab− a2b− ab2 + a2b2 = 0
(3.7)
minimizes the size of intermediate polynomials is {(S,C), (p2, g2), (S1, C1), (p1, g1)},
as in the GB reduction. The signals shown in brackets can be rewritten in any order
as they depend on common inputs. Equation (3.7) shows the rewriting steps for
the circuit. The terms shown in bold face indicate those that are reduced to zero
during polynomial simplification. For brevity, the substitution is shown for each pair
of variables applied at once. For example: F/(C, S) means rewriting of F using C
and S variables of polynomials f8, f7.
During the rewriting, two types of simplifications can be observed:
• Simplification of the terms with same monomials; for example, 2g2 − g2 = g2,
in Step 1. In the process, some polynomial terms are reduced to 0. This is a
common simplification applied in GB reduction as well.
• Lowering the term x2 to x, since the signal variables are binary. This can be
seen in Steps 2, 3, and 4, shown in bold face. For example, in step 2 we have:
S1c0 − S21c0 − S1c20 + S21c20 = S1c0 − S1c0 − S1c0 + S1c0 = 0. Similarly, in step
3: (p1g1 − p1g21) = p1g1 − p1g1 = 0, etc. This simplification is simpler and
can be executed faster than dividing the polynomials by the respective field
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polynomials (x2 − x), as it is done in computer algebra approach. This is one
of the main reasons for greater efficiency of the algebraic rewriting compared to
GB reduction.
Subsequently, the final result reduces F = Sout − Fspec to zero, indicating that the
circuit correctly implements a full adder.
It should be noted that in addition to the two basic simplification rules mentioned
above (rewriting the gates with common inputs, and the x2 → x reduction), more
sophisticated simplifications can be applied to the running polynomial Sig during
rewriting by analyzing the structure of the gate-level network. For example, recog-
nizing that some signal g is a product of XOR and AND signals with the same fanin
inputs will reduce signal g to zero. This simplification, called an XOR-AND vanishing
rule has been used by [41], but for clarity of the illustration, it has not been taken
into account here.
3.4 AIG Rewriting
The algebraic rewriting technique described in the previous section can be further
improved by performing rewriting using the functional AIG (Add-Inverter Graph)
representation of the circuit instead of its gate level structure. This section provides
a brief overview how this is accomplished, with details provided in [50].
AIG (And-Inverter Graph) is a combinational Boolean network composed of two-
input AND gates and inverters [2]. Each internal node of the AIG represents a
two-input AND function; the graph edges are labeled to indicate a possible inversion
of the signal. We use the cut-enumeration approach of ABC [2] to detect XOR
and Majority (MAJ) functions with a common set of variables; they are essential
components of adder trees that are present in most arithmetic circuits in some form
[50]. After detecting the XOR and MAJ components of the adder’s AIG, rewriting
skips over the detected adders, significantly speeding up the rewriting process. Figure
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3.3 illustrates the process for the full adder (FA) circuit from Figure 3.1. In Figure
3.3 the groups of nodes (6,7,8) and (9,11,12) correspond to half adders (HA). The
functions rooted at nodes 6 and 9 are majority (AND) functions, and those at nodes
12 and 8 are XORs. Subsequently, the functions at node 12 (S) and node 10 (C) are
identified as XOR3 and MAJ3, respectively, on the shared inputs, a, b, c0. The AIG
rewriting of Sout = 2C +S over the extracted XOR3 and MAJ3 nodes is trivial, with
the nonlinear monomials automatically cancelled, as shown in Eqn. 3.8.
2C + S = 2(ab+ ac0 + bc0 − 2abc0)
+ (a+ b+ co − 2ab− 2ac0 − 2bc0 + 4abc0)
= a+ b+ co
(3.8)
The resulting signature matches the specification, which clearly indicates that the
circuit is a full adder. As illustrated with this example, the AIG rewriting requires
considerably fewer terms than the standard algebraic rewriting.
Figure 3.3: AIG rewriting of a full adder circuit from Figure 3.1.
Data structure: AIG rewriting is implemented in ABC with the polynomial
data structure, type Pln Man t. Its main components include: 1) the AIG manager
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(Gia Man) that represents the input design; and 2) two vector hash tables using type
Hsh VecMan t are used for storing the constants and monomials. The hash tables
of monomials include coefficient vectors and monomial vectors. When substitution
is applied to the leading term, new monomials are created and the substituted one
removed. For example, when ab+ c+ bd is substituted by a = b+ d, the monomial ab
is removed first, and b and bd are added to Pln Man t. During the process of adding
the new monomials, the program will first check if these monomials already exist in
Pln Man t; in this case only the coefficient of these monomials will be changed accord-
ingly. In this example, two new monomials are generated by the substitution, namely
b2, reduced to b, and bd. Since bd already exists in the expression, the coefficient 1 of
bd is replaced by 2, resulting in b+ c+ 2bd.
3.5 Comparison between GB Reduction and Rewriting
It should be clear from the above discussion that both methods, the GB reduc-
tion and the algebraic rewriting, are equivalent in the sense that they both perform
polynomial reduction. The GB reduction scheme achieves polynomial reduction by
division, in fact, performing Gaussian elimination. In contrast, algebraic rewriting
does it by substituting the gate output variable by the polynomial expression of the
gate’s function. While the goal of GB reduction scheme is to reduce F = Sout−Fspec
modulo the set of implementation polynomials G to 0, it can also be used to extract
the arithmetic function by reducing Sout modulo G, and interpret the result as the
functional specification of the circuit Fspec. In the algebraic rewriting scheme, the goal
is to rewrite the output signature Sout to Sin, the expression in the primary inputs,
and check if it matches the expected specification Fspec. If Sin = Fspec, the circuit is
correct; otherwise it is faulty. Alternatively, as illustrated above, algebraic rewriting
can be also applied to F = Sout − Fspec, as in the GB approach.
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Variable substitution of algebraic rewriting (line 9 of Algorithm 2) seems simpler
than the main step of polynomial division of the GB reduction (line 8 of Algorithm 1).
On the other hand, it requires additional multiplication of the terms and expansion
into a sum of products. Hence, the complexity of these steps is comparable. Both
methods avoid explicit computation of the Gro¨bner basis, but achieve it by different
means. In the GB reduction it is done by setting the variable order in the ring so that
all variables are in reverse topological order, which makes the implementation set G a
Gro¨bner basis. In the algebraic rewriting scheme on the other hand, the polynomials
fi ∈ G are sorted in reverse topological order to effect the rewriting. As a result,
both methods ensure that the polynomial base is a Gro¨bner basis. However, there
are some essential differences between the two methods that affect their efficiency.
• The GB reduction scheme requires the field polynomials J0 =< x2 − x > to be
added to the base G in order to keep the variables Boolean. This increases the
size of the Gro¨bner basis and results in a larger search space in each iteration.
Whereas in the rewriting scheme, the reduction by < x2 − x > is solved in a
simpler way, namely by lowering x2 to x via a simple data structure (line 10 in
Algorithm 2).
• In the algebraic rewriting scheme, the gate polynomials fi ∈ G are ordered in
reverse topological order (line 5 in Algorithm 2) so that each gate polynomial fi
is used exactly once. Furthermore, the selected polynomial is used to perform
the rewriting by a simple string substitution and is never needed again. In
contrast, in each iteration of the GB reduction one has to search for a polynomial
fi that divides the leading term of F under reduction. While in principle the
GB reduction can also work over an ordered list of gate polynomials, this does
not apply to the field polynomials < x2 − x >, needed for the reduction. Since
the appearance of intermediate signals in nonlinear terms xk is unpredictable,
it is not possible to pre-order the list of field polynomials in GB reduction.
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CHAPTER 4
FORMAL VERIFICATION OF INTEGER DIVIDERS:
DIVISION BY A CONSTANT
Division is one of the most complex arithmetic operators to implement and requires
careful hardware implementation and verification [16][46]. The difficulty of formally
verifying hardware implementation of dividers can be attributed to the mathematical
model of a divider: its characteristic function cannot be written as a closed-form
expression, making it difficult to assign to it an output signature. In this chapter, we
present a verification methodology for a constant divider, where the divisor value is
fixed to a constant integer. Albeit a simpler case of verification, it provides us with
the basic understanding of the underlying issues applicable to divider verification.
Later, in the next chapter, we present a generalized approach for verifying generic
array dividers using approach similar to that developed in this chapter.
4.1 Introduction
An operation that comes up frequently in digital systems is a division of an integer
by a constant. For example, such an operation is required in computer simulations
that use Jacobi stencil algorithm to compute an average of three numbers; in arith-
metic for base conversions, number theoretic codes, and graphics codes; in signal pro-
cessing for computing the sample mean, the sample variance, or the automatic gain
control. Finally, divide-by-constant is useful for memory bank multiplexing which
requires division by small integers, or to support compiler optimization to generate
integer divisions to compute loop counts and subtract pointers [19]. The frequent
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appearance of such operation in many applications justifies creating a specialized op-
erator in embedded systems design, referred to as ”divider by a constant” [32]. In this
chapter, we concentrate on the verification of a division by a constant and conclude it
by presenting a preliminary verification analysis of a restoring generic divider circuit.
While division by a constant 2k can be efficiently implemented by shifters, division
by other constants is more complex. Many algorithms for division by a constant use
table-based approach and implement it using look-up tables (LUT). A notable exam-
ple of such an implementation is a table-based SRT division implemented in an Intel
Pentium Processor. The infamous Pentium bug in its floating point division (FDIV)
instruction has galvanized the verification efforts [42][5] for divider circuits. The work
by [20],[21] address the verification of array dividers by applying reverse engineering
methods to obtain a high-level arithmetic model from the low-level circuit implemen-
tation. The resulting arithmetic operations are compared with the abstract model
of the divider using structural matching. The extracted components include logical
bit level adders with sum generation logic (SGL), carry propagation logic (CPL) and
controlling logic (CL). The technique applies column-based XOR extraction, which
relies on a regular structure of the adder trees and on the presence of sum generation
and carry propagation components. Lack of those components at the right places
indicates a potential bug. The limitation of the method is that it assumes a known,
well structured architecture and that adders are represented with XOR gates, which
may not be the case in a synthesized circuit.
This chapter describes the verification technique for a divide-by-constant circuit,
later generalized for the verification of a restoring generic divider. Our work is based
on an algebraic rewriting model, which performs arithmetic function extraction, origi-
nally proposed and successfully applied to the verification of integer and Galois Field
multipliers [10] [53]. The method has been suitably modified for dividers by iden-
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tifying and taking advantage of the ”vanishing monomials”, which are an intrinsic
property of table-based divide-by-constant architecture.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides the necessary
background and the survey of the implementation and verification of the divide-by-
constant architectures. Section 4.3 shows the detailed verification methodology, while
Section 4.4 presents the verification results and their analysis. We also compare our
approach to an exhaustive simulation of the respective circuits. Preliminary results
for a restoring generic divider are also presented, showing the applicability of our
technique to a more generic case.
4.2 Background
The algebraic based verification methods described in earlier chapter 3 have been
successfully applied to complex adders and multipliers, including Booth, [51][41] but
have not been applied to divider circuits, because of the difficulty of modeling the
divider’s specification. It seems at first that such a rewriting model cannot be directly
applied to the divider. The characteristic function of the divider can be described by
the following expression:
X = D ·Q+R, with R < D (4.1)
where X (the dividend) and D (the divisor) are the inputs, and Q (the quotient) and
R (the remainder) are the outputs where R < D. The problem is that the outputs,
Q,R, cannot be directly expressed in terms of the inputs X,D. Hence it is not clear
what the input signature and the output signature are. However, in the case of a
constant divider, input divisor D is a known constant making the analytical I/O
relationship straightforward. In this context, Sigin = X and Sigout = D ·Q+R. The
remainder of the thesis presents how algebraic rewriting is utilized for verification of
divider and square-root circuits.
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4.2.1 Divider Circuit Implementation
There are two main approaches to implementing arithmetic division: 1) division
by addition/subtraction, such as SRT, restoring, non-restoring; and 2) division by
reciprocation, or multiplication by the inverse via Newton-Raphson or Goldsmith
algorithm [29]. A wide majority of practical division algorithms, such as SRT, resort
to a look-up table (LUT) based implementation, a table-based combinational logic
technique studied in [32][13][46]. These algorithms use a reference table, precomputed
for a particular value of the divisor, implemented as a LUT. Such an implementation
is particularly well-suited for the division by a constant. The dividend X is divided
by the divisor D to produce quotient Q and the remainder R, which provides an input
carry for the next block.
Figure 4.1: Pencil and Paper division operation and the basic divider block.
The author of [46] prove that this computation is still valid for any arbitrary radix
of X. Thus the division can be implemented as a single block handling n bits, or n
blocks handling one bit each, or any intermediate values. Another divider architecture
analyzed in this work is based on the restoring algorithm, discussed in Section 4.4.3
and shown in Figure 4.7 in the later part of the chapter.
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4.3 Verification
Our verification scheme is based on the functional extraction method of [51] [50],
reviewed in detail in Chapter 2. We first illustrate our method for table-based divider
with a single block of the divider, and then show how to verify the whole circuit
unrolled by the required number of blocks. We will also discuss the case when the
divider is faulty, with bugs injected in the implementation.
4.3.1 Verification of the Constant Divider
In the iterative, divide-by-constant circuit, the divider is partitioned into a number
of blocks, each having the structure shown in Figure 4.1(b). Figure 4.2 shows a generic
configuration, where multiple blocks can be cascaded together.
Figure 4.2: Generic divider block for X divided by const. d = 3
Let N be the number of blocks, and k the number bits of the dividend X. If k/N
is not an integer, the most significant block will have some inputs appended with
the required numbers of zeros. The bit size m of Ri and Ci is the same, and it is
determined by the size of the divisor D.
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Consider block Bi, shown in Figure 4.1. In the following, index i refers both to
the block position and to the chunk of the respective word, Ci, Xi, Qi, Ri, associated
with the given block. The following summarizes the terms and parameters of the
divider block:
• D - divisor (a hardwired constant), D 6= 0
• Xi, Ci - dividend and carry-in for block Bi
• Qi, Ri - quotient and remainder for block Bi
• n = dk/Ne - number of bits of Xi and Qi
• m = (blog2 (D − 1)c+ 1) - bit-width of Ci and Ri
4.3.2 Single Block Verification
To explain the basic idea, consider a single-bit block architecture, n = 1, for the
division by constant D = 3, with m = 2.
In the LUT-based division algorithm, each basic block is implemented as a lookup
table with entries for all possible inputs, Ci, Xi, and the values of the corresponding
outputs Qi, Ri.
a ) Function Table b ) Truth table of LUT
Figure 4.3: Divide-by-3 block specification tables
35
Figure 4.3 shows the specification tables (i.e., the function table and the LUT
truth table) for the basic block of divide-by-3 divider. From the function table, one
can derive the word-level input/output relation, shown in Equation 4.2, where Ri is
fed to the next block as Ci−1. To verify the functionality of the basic block, we need
to prove that Equation 4.2 is correct for every input assignment.
2Ci +Xi = 3Qi +Ri (4.2)
The coefficient 2 of Ci comes from the fact that Ci and Xi form one word. In radix
2, the term Ci =
∑n−1
k=0 2
kCik, where Cik refers to bit k of block i. The coefficient 3
of Qi is determined by the value of the divisor, D = 3 in our example.
Equation 4.3 shows the generic bit-level equation for an arbitrary block i. It
is derived from Eq. 4.2 by substituting for a given block i, Ci = 2Ci1 + Ci0 and
Ri = 2Ri1 +Ri0, since m = 2.
4Ci1 + 2Ci0 +Xi0 = 3Qi0 + 2Ri1 +Ri0 (4.3)
The left-hand-side of Equation (4.3) is the Input Signature, Sigin while the right-
hand-side is the Output Signature, Sigout, as defined above in Section 4.3.1. In order
to prove the functional correctness of the divider, we need to rewrite Sigout using
algebraic expressions of the logic-gate implementation and compare the resulting ex-
pression with Sigin. If the two expressions are equal, the circuit is proved to be
correct. The comparison of the polynomial expressions can be done using TEDs [8],
BMDs [3], or similar canonical representations capable to compare two polynomials.
To illustrate the rewriting process, consider the one-block gate-level implementa-
tion of the division of X by constant 3, shown in Figure 4.4. The output signature for
this circuit, using the index notation in the figure, is Sigout = 3Q0 +2R1 +R0. Each of
the output variables, Q0, R1, R0 are successively replaced by the algebraic expression
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a ) Correct circuit b ) Faulty circuit
Figure 4.4: Gate level implementation of a single-block, one-bit architecture of a X/3
divider. Output signature Sigout = 3Q0 + 2R1 + R0; the expected input signature is
Sigin = 4C1 + 2C0 +X0.
of their respective gates, as defined by Eq. 3.1. Each of the internal signals are in
turn replaced by the expression of the logic gate they represent, etc., until the final
expression contains only the primary input variables. In a functionally correct divider
circuit, as in Figure 4.4(a), the resulting input signature should be
Sigin = 4C1 + 2C0 +X0 (4.4)
However, the expression Sig obtained by rewriting Sigout through the logic gates of
the correct 1-bit divisor is actually equal to:
Sig = (4C1 + 2C0 +X0)− 2C0C1X0 (4.5)
which does not match the expected specification Sigin in Eq.(4.4).
The reason for this mismatch can be understood by analyzing the truth table in
Figure 4.3. Note that the table contains some entries, namely {C1C0X} = 110, 111,
for which the quotient Q0 cannot be encoded in one bit, with the remainder being
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strictly less than the divisor; hence those entries are considered invalid. In this case
the combination {C1C0} = 11 is invalid. This can be translated into a logic constraint,
expressed by expression C1C0 = 0 and used to simplify the resulting signature. In-
deed, substituting C1C0 = 0 into Equation 4.5 reduces it to the expected Sigin,
proving that the circuit in Figure 4.4(a) correctly implements a divby3 computation.
4.3.3 Vanishing Monomials
For the purpose of this work, the monomials that correspond to invalid entries,
such as C1C0 above, are defined as vanishing monomials, since in the functionally
correct implementation they always evaluate to zero. The vanishing monomials help
remove the redundant terms during the verification process. The vanishing mono-
mials and the corresponding simplifying constraints can readily be derived from the
architecture for a given value of the divisor, where invalid input assignments corre-
spond to don′t-care conditions; refer to Figure 4.3. The following theorem relates
vanishing monomials to the input signature computed for the circuit.
Theorem: The input signature Sigin of the circuit contains vanishing monomials
associated with the don′tcare set of the truth table, regardless whether these don’t-care
products are used during synthesis or not.
Proof. Let F be a single-bit output of the arithmetic function, corresponding to one
of the output columns of the truth table. It can be implemented as a disjunction (OR)
of product terms. Since product term is a conjunction (AND) of literals of individual
variables, it is represented in an algebraic form as a product of the corresponding
variables. This is also true for products that include complemented variables; for
example a ∧ ¬b = a · (1 − b) = a − a · b, and similarly for arbitrary variable po-
larities. Hence, any product from the valid entries of the truth table may contain
vanishing monomials. The same argument applies to the case when the input vari-
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ables (in this case C) appear in different product terms; a disjunction of those terms
will also create a product of the respective literals, according to the Equation (3.1):
a∨ b = a+ b−a · b, where a, b can be any product term. As a result, the signature ex-
pression generated during rewriting may contain product of variables that correspond
to vanishing monomials.
We illustrate this theorem for the circuit with the truth table in Figure 4.3. As-
sume that output Q is implemented without don’t-cares as Q = C1 ∧ ¬C0 ∨ ¬C1 ∧
C0 ∧X. This can be represented algebraically using Equation 3.1 as
Q = C1 + C0X − C1C0 − C1C0X (4.6)
The invalid product C1C0 (to be removed from the final expression) will therefore
appear as a vanishing monomial, even if the circuit is synthesized without don′t-cares.
The result of the theorem can be readily extended to an arbitrary form, including
product of sums and factored forms, which also include AND and OR operations.
The generation of vanishing monomials is illustrated here with an example of a
single-bit block of the divide-by-5 circuit. For the divisor D = 5, the remainder R
and carry-in C are strictly less than 5, and hence are encoded with m = 3 bits. This
means that the don’t care entries 101, 110, 111 for variables C2C1C0 are invalid and
can be treated as don′t-care. Even if they are not provided explicitly, they can be
readily extracted knowing the bit size of the divisor.
We can compute the algebraic expression for the invalid entries using algebraic
rewriting discussed in Section 3.3. The logical sum of the three terms can be computed
in the algebraic domain as
C2(1− C1)C0 + C2C1(1− C0) + C2C1C0
= C2C0 + C2C1 − C2C1C0
(4.7)
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This is in fact an algebraic equivalent of the Boolean cover of the three terms, with
prime implicants, C2C0, C2C1, C2C1C0, or, equivalently {1-1, 11-, 111}. Of the three,
only the first two suffice to represent the logic, since each of them dominates C2C1C0,
which can be removed. Hence only the first two monomials, C2C0 and C2C1 are
needed and are identified as vanishing monomials.
In summary, the automatic generation of vanishing monomials (for single and
multiple blocks) includes the following steps:
1. Extract the unused (don′t care) entries from the truth table.
2. Compute algebraic expression of the product terms associated with the don′t care
entries.
3. Remove the negative and redundant monomials.
4.3.4 Verification of a Multiple-Block Architecture
Figure 4.5 shows a block level diagram of an X/3 divider using a two-block archi-
tecture, each with n = 2 and m = 2.
In the following, to simplify the notation, a single-letter index i represents the bit
position of the entire circuit, rather than the block number. The internal signals are
indexed by a pair, ij, referring to block i and bit j. The rewriting starts with the
primary outputs Q3, Q2, Q1, Q0, R1, R0, with the output signature
Sigout = 3(8Q3 + 4Q2 + 2Q1 +Q0) + 2R1 +R0 (4.8)
The expression propagates through both blocks, B1, B0 until all the primary inputs,
C1, C0, X3, X2, X1, X0 have been reached. The expected input signature at the pri-
mary inputs of the divider circuit is
Sigin = 32C1 + 16C0 + 8X3 + 4X2 + 2X1 +X0 (4.9)
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Figure 4.5: Division of a 4-bit divide-by-3 in a two-bit block divider circuit. Rewriting is
applied in the opposite direction to the flow of the data.
In this particular stand-alone two-block configuration, C1 and C0 are set to zero, but
in general they are coming from a 2-bit remainder of the higher level block. However,
as explained earlier, the rewriting process will generate additional terms related to the
product of the carry-in signals, the vanishing monomials, defined in Section 4.3.3. The
actual input signature obtained by the rewriting contains additional terms, denoted
below as F (V,C,X), in addition to the expected input signature of Equation 4.9.
Sig = F (V,C,X) + 32C1 + 16C0 + 8X3 + 4X2 + 2X1 +X0 (4.10)
The term F (V,C,X) is a polynomial containing the terms associated with the van-
ishing monomials V , in this case C11, C10, and with the redundant terms containing
C and X. In a correct circuit, F (V,C,X) will reduce to zero, proving that the circuit
meets the specification.
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Vanishing monomials expressed in terms of C01, C00 for block 0 gets transformed
in terms of C11, C10 and X for block 1. Hence the size of these terms may grow
during the successive rewriting steps over multiple blocks, which in a correct circuit
will evaluate to zero. This build-up of a vanishing expression can be large and it may
significantly decelerate the performance of function extraction; it is often referred to
as a fat-belly effect. In a large circuit, this effect is even more pronounced since the
vanishing monomials may be rewritten into more complex (yet redundant) monomials,
causing a potential blow-up in the size of the computed signature.
One way to address this problem is to remove redundancy (vanishing monomials
and boundary conditions) at the boundary of a given block before propagating the
signature to the next block. However, in an unrolled circuit, synthesized across the
block boundaries, it may be impossible to determine the boundary between the ad-
jacent blocks. Fortunately, in the case of the division by a constant this information
is readily available from the invalid (don’t-care) entries in the lookup table, as ex-
plained in Section 4.3.3, unless those signals are renamed by the synthesis process.
The extraction, detection, and removal of vanishing monomials is fully automated for
this methodology.
4.3.5 Faulty Circuit Verification
Let us consider the divide-by-3 circuit discussed in the previous sections. The
output signature is Sigout = 3Q0 + 2R1 + R0 and the expected input signature of
the correct circuit is Sigin = 4C1 + 2C0 + X0. Assume that the fault is caused
by swapping the second and third entries in the truth-table of Figure 4.3. Then
the gate-level implementation will be different, as shown in Figure 4.4(b), causing
the algebraic transformations also to be different. As a result, the input signature
obtained by backward rewriting, after removing the vanishing monomials, is Sigin =
−C1X0 + C0 + 2X0 + 4C1. The mismatch between such obtained expression and the
expected specification indicates that the circuit is faulty.
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It should be noted that, if there is a fault in the circuit that causes R11R10 = 1, the
removal of this product as a vanishing monomial will not result in a wrong conclusion
about the correctness of the circuit. Assume that block B1 in Figure 4.5 is faulty and
block B0 is correct. The rewriting process starts from signals Q01, Q00, R01, R00 and
transforms them into signals C01, C00, X01, X00. Since block B0 is correct, the output
signature across this block is also correct and linear after removing the vanishing
monomials. In the next step, even when the vanishing monomial C01C00 (which
in block B1 becomes R11R10) is set to zero, the individual signals R11, R10 are not
removed from the expression and they are rewritten up to primary inputs, regardless
of what their actual value is. This is also apparent by examining Equation 4.5, where
the product C0C1 is removed as vanishing monomial, but the individual variables C0
and C1 are not! If block B1 is faulty, the final computed signature will not match
the correct signature/specification, because the expressions for R11, R10, propagated
to the PIs, are faulty. Therefore, removing the vanishing monomials in any of the
earlier stages will not affect the correctness of the signature in the subsequent blocks;
and they never appear as a product in the output signature for a given block since
the output signature is linear.
4.4 Results and Analysis
The program implementing the described verification method for the constant
divider was coded in Python and C++ and the experiments were conducted on a 64-
bit Intel Core i7-7600 CPU, 2.80GHz × 2, with 31.0 GB of memory. The circuits were
generated using an open-source hardware generator, FloPoCo [14], and synthesized
using ABC tool [31] onto standard cell, gate-level circuits.
Four sets of results are presented, including: two types of unrolling schemes (mod-
ular and unrolled), verification of a restoring constant divider architecture, and a
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numerical simulation. We also show the results for a generic, restoring divider archi-
tecture.
4.4.1 Modular Architecture
In the Modular architecture, each block is instantiated the required number of
times (depending upon the dividend bit-width). In this scheme, the boundary be-
tween adjacent blocks is known and the vanishing monomials are extracted and re-
moved from the signature at each block, before rewriting the next block in series.
The experiments include both correct (bug-free) and faulty circuits. The faults were
emulated by randomly injecting multiple faults in the truth table into the valid por-
tion of the look-up table. The invalid part of the table is not affected since it is used
as a don’t-care in synthesis.
Table 4.1 shows the verification run time for the divide-by-constant iterative ar-
chitecture for several block sizes with a 32-bit dividend x. The results are shown for
divisors value of up to 283 and a 9-bit remainder.
Table 4.1: Verification results for the divide-by-constant divider circuit using our
technique for: (1) Modular 1-bit block, 2-bit block; and 2) 4-bit block architecture
with a 32-bit dividend X (Figure 4.2). Time-out TO = 1200 s, Memory-out MO =
16 GB
Modular Unroll
















3 2 712 0.06 1 0.06 665 2.26 895 0.90
11 4 1919 1.15 2 1.11 1917 2.23 4045 MO
17 5 1763 0.81 3 .75 2236 5.83 2492 MO
31 5 1825 0.31 5 0.27 1676 0.85 10163 MO
61 6 3715 3.50 8 3.56
Memory Out
89 7 4520 13.5 5 16.71
113 7 3652 6.68 7 7.21
139 8 5542 27.9 7 94.75
191 8 4736 9.67 5 11.36
251 8 6410 110.4 5 113.5
257 9 6549 22.56 7 23.0
283 9 8951 643.8 9 638.4
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The table shows that the verification time does not change monotonically with
the size of the divisor and can be explained by the content of the look-up table.
This non-monotonic behavior can be explained by examining the content of the truth
tables for the corresponding divisions and its dependence on the value of the divisor.
Consider, for example, a Divide-by-17 in Table 4.1. The size of the LUT is 6 bits
(one bit for the dividend X and 5 bits for the carry-in C, same as the size of the
remainder). Of the 64 entries in the LUT only 35 are used, while the remaining 29
entries are invalid and treated as don’t-cares. Whereas in the Divide-by-31 circuit,
with the same size of the remainder and the LUT table, 62 out of 64 entries are used
and only two entries are redundant.
Table 4.1 also shows the results for the Modular, two-bit and four-bit block archi-
tectures for different divisors. The lower verification performance for these circuits
compared to a one-bit architecture is caused by a drastically larger number of gates
per block, preventing efficient removal of vanishing monomials during rewriting.
4.4.2 Flat Unroll Architecture
In the Flat Unroll architecture the circuit is unrolled and synthesized (optimized)
across the block boundaries. This causes any hierarchical information about the block
boundaries to be lost, making the verification process harder. Since under this scheme
the vanishing monomials are not removed at the block boundaries, the verification
problem is significantly more memory intensive. As a result, the largest value of the
dividend verified under this methodology is 29 shown in Table 4.2.
4.4.3 The Restoring Constant Divider
We also tested an alternative architecture based on a standard restoring divider
[29], in which the divisor D has been hardwired to a particular constant, Figure 5.4.
The restoring divider has been implemented and synthesized using ABC [31] as a
tool. Constants from the bits of D are propagated through and used to optimize the
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Table 4.2: Verification results for the divide-by-constant divider circuit using our
technique for Flat-Unroll architecture with a 9-bit dividend X (Figure 4.2). Time-








3 2 105 2.96
11 4 300 42.6
17 5 192 6.68




overall circuit. Our rewriting-based verification technique has been integrated with
the ABC data structure as a customized polynomial rewriting command &polyn.
Unfortunately, ABC was unable to verify the circuits beyond 22 bits, resulting in
segmentation fault over 24 GB. Table 4.3 shows the results for such a restoring divide-
by-constant circuit for the 22-bit dividend.
Table 4.3: Verification results for the divide-by-constant divider circuit using our
technique for Restoring Constant Divider with a 22-bit dividend X. TO = 1200s,








3 2 183 0.01
11 4 488 2.42
17 5 538 4.13
31 5 638 10.4
61 6 726 9.12
89 7 726 10.9
113 7 765 3.82
139 8 766 71.1
191 8 892 SF
251 8 880 14.53
257 9 786 57.2
283 9 871 89.9
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4.4.4 Simulation Based Verification
We simulated the divide-by-constant dividers(different architectures) for different
size of divisors D and dividend X, ranging from 28 to 232. We used Modelsim SE
10.0 on a Xeon 5650 processor with 6 cores (2.67GHz), 24 GB of RAM, and 350 GB
free hard disk space.
Figure 4.6 shows the simulation results for D = 257 and 283 (bold lines) and
compares their results with the rewriting approach (dotted line) described in this
section. The following cases are considered:
• LUT-based implementation generated by FloPoCo [14];
• Gate-level implementation of a LUT, synthesized with ABC; and
• Restoring constant divider implemented with ABC.
As shown in Figure 4.6, the simulations are faster for gate-level than the LUT-
based implementation. In contrast to our rewriting approach, the value of divisor D
does not have significant impact on the simulation time.
The results show that the simulation approach is competitive for dividend bit-
widths up to 22 bits (simulation time slightly longer than of our approach, for constant
dividers). With higher bit-widths however, simulation time becomes prohibitive. For
example, the simulation for (Gate-level) dividends larger than 28 bits required 15,264
seconds (4h24m), with memory out of 24GB for larger bit-widths. Furthermore, the
simulation based experiments shown here are run on a Xeon 5650 with six cores,
which is a much more powerful machine compared to all of the other results (Core
i7-7600 CPU with two cores). Regardless, our technique still outperforms simulation
based verification schemes for LUT-based and gate-level but lacks in performance,
compared to the simulation results for the restoring constant divider.
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a ) Divisor = 257 b ) Divisor = 283
Figure 4.6: Exhaustive simulation run time for divisors D=257 and D=283 for different
implementations, as a function of the dividend bit-width. Dotted Lines show equivalent for
our rewriting technique.
Figure 4.7: Restoring Generic 3-bit Divider [40].
4.4.5 The Restoring Generic Divider
This section demonstrates the applicability of our approach to the implementation
of constant divider by a generic restoring divider, shown in Figure 4.7. Table 4.4 shows
the preliminary data for the verification run-time of a restoring divider over an AIG.
As the complexity of the design increases beyond 1000 gates, the ABC tool crashes
with a segmentation fault, with a memory consumption of 20GB. The reason being
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that the underlying vector data-structure is not able to contain the prohibitively
large polynomial. Under this methodology, the divider circuit is heavily optimized
and hence any boundary information between different modular blocks is lost, as
shown in Table 4.4.
Our constant divider methodology is not scalable to generic dividers as of yet
and currently the simulation based verification outperforms our technique. However,
it still demonstrates the significance of its applicability to generic divider circuits.
Chapter 5 presents a layered rewriting strategy to avoid this memory explosion issue
to some extent.
Table 4.4: Verification run time for the Restoring generic Divider. #Bits show the









3 8 119 0.00 0.05
4 16 216 0.01 0.15
5 32 341 0.08 0.19
6 64 494 0.59 0.45
7 128 675 4.78 0.60
8 256 884 36.96 0.97
9 512 1121 SF:264 3.4
10 1024 1386 SF:232 13.55
19 1048576 4325 SF:240 TO
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CHAPTER 5
FORMAL VERIFICATION OF HARDWARE DIVIDERS
USING LAYERED VERIFICATION STRATEGY
5.1 Introduction
In this work, we concentrate on combinational dividers: integer divider, and the
fractional fixed point divider, essential components of floating point division unit.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 develops an algebraic verification
technique for the fractional and integer dividers. Section 5.3 presents some prelimi-
nary results and conclusions.
5.2 Fixed Point and Integer Dividers
This section describes our approach to verify two types of dividers: 1) the frac-
tional divider, operating on fractional numbers, an essential component of the floating
point divider; and 2) the integer divider, with the same structure as the divide-by-
constant divider, to be used in algebraic rewriting.
Current divider verification methods model the divider with a series of controlled
add/sub operations. The most advanced divider verification method to-date is proba-
bly that of [22], as briefly reviewed previously. It is based on reverse engineering of the
gate-level implementation by creating a logic bit-level model of the circuit (LBLA),
and matching it against a well-structured functional reference model (FBLA). The
method relies on extracting essential components, such as carry propagation logic and
sum generation logic that are expected to be present in some form in the divider. It
also searches for XORs and specific logic patterns present in the reference divider.
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An error is declared if such functions cannot be identified in the circuit. While the
CPU runtimes are impressive, such a reverse engineering method, based on a strictly
structural pattern matching, does not accomplish the functional verification per se. It
may happen that some components do not match the expected logic, but the circuit
may work correctly as an ensemble. Or, that some logic is represented without XORs.
As an example, Figure 3.1 shows a non-standard full adder implementation without
XORs.
In contrast, in our work the divider is modeled in a single functional specification,
X = D · Q + R, to be compared to the signature computed by algebraic rewriting.
This approach works for any combinational divider circuit, regardless of its internal
structure.
5.2.1 Functional Verification Model
Fractional divider is an essential part of hardware for floating point division. The
dividend X and the divisor D are normalized by pre-shifting to comply with the
IEEE 754 standard. Figure 6.7 shows the functional model of the divider verification
considered in this work. The blue box below the divider is a ”reverse division unit”,
RDU, which computes D ·Q + R. The verification goal is to check if the expression
is equivalent to (or reduces by algebraic rewrting to) the dividend X.
Figure 5.1: Functional verification model of the divider.
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One way to solve this problem is to apply a SAT or SMT technique; however
instead of comparing the divider against a reference design we compare the RDU
circuit (D·Q+R) against the dividendX. As a proof of concept, we tested this method
on both restoring and nonrestoring array dividers. A miter was added between the
input X of the divider and the output of RDU and the ABC system [31] was used to
generate a CNF file for the SAT problem and solved it using miniSAT . While the
solution required only 4.4 seconds to prove a 16-bit X/8-bit D divider, a 32-bit/16-bit
divider timed out at 3600 seconds.
A more promising method to verify the divider is based on the algebraic rewriting
using the structure shown in Figure 6.7. In this approach the output signature poly-
nomial, Sigout = D ·Q + R, based on the outputs Q,R and the divisor D is created
and algebraically rewritten through the divider network to the primary inputs, where
in the correct circuit it should be equal to the dividend X.
For the illustration purposes we consider here an unsigned nonrestoring divider,
a preferred hardware implementation that can be easily extended to signed division.
In fact, both the restoring and nonrestoring dividers satisfy X = D · Q + R, with
R < |D|, but the nonrestoring divisor requires a minor correction when the remainder
R and the dividend X have opposite signs, to make sure that R < D [29].
5.2.2 Fractional vs. Integer Divider
We now demonstrate that the fractional divider can be used for integer division
[29]. In fact, it is only a matter of interpretation of the result, whether a fractional
or an integer division is performed by the hardware, as demonstrated by the example
below (see Figure 5.2). This will allow us to perform algebraic rewriting on the
divider’s circuit, while working only with integers.
In the following example we consider unsigned fractional numbers, with 0 in the




Figure 5.2: Nonrestoring 7-4 divider (n = 3): a) Fractional divider; b) Controlled
Add/Subtract (CAS) block; c) Integer divider
with the IEEE standard. We assume that the bit-widths are sized as required to avoid
an overflow or an underflow, i.e., X has size 2n + 1 and D,Q,R are of size n + 1,
including 0 before the fractional dot [29].
• Fractional Divider (Figure 5.2(a)): The dividend and the divisor are preshifted,
such that X < D, so that the result Q is also a fraction. The following repre-
sentation is used:
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X = 0.x1....x6, D = 0.d1d2d3, Q = 0.q1q2q3, R = 0.r1r2r3.
To illustrate this issue, consider the following example:
X = (0.100000)2 = 1/2 and D = (0.110)2 = 3/4
which satisfies a non-overflow condition, X < D. The result is:
Q = (0.101)2 = 5/8, R = (0.010)2 = 1/4,
as shown in Figure 5.2(a). The computed remainder R needs to be multiplied
by 2−3 (determined by its number of bits) to obtain the final remainder R′ =
2−3 · 1/4 = 1/32. Hence,
X = D ·Q+R′ = 5/8 · 3/4 + 1/32 = 1/2,
which is a correct result.
• Integer Divider (Figure 5.2c): The result in the integer domain can be ob-
tained with exactly the same hardware, but with the bits of the operand and
the results ordered in the opposite direction. In this case,
X = 0x6...x2x1 = (0100000)2 = 32,
D = 0d3d2d1 = (0110)2 = 6,
Q = 0q3q2q1 = (0101)2 = 5,
R = 0r3r2r1 = (0010)2 = 2.
The result is correct: X = D · Q + R = 6 · 5 + 2 = 32 and no adjustment of
R is necessary in the integer case. Note that, as long as the operands and the
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result registers are of correct size, the integer divider will always compute the
correct value, with the difference between X and Q·D being compensated by the
remainder R. The equivalence between the fractional divider and the integer
divider, as illustrated above, gives us a right to use our algebraic rewriting
technique on the integer divider to prove the fractional divider circuit.
5.2.3 Layered Rewriting
When rewriting output Q or R of the divider, the final polynomial at the primary
inputs, Sigin, will be expressed in terms of the primary inputs, X,D. In a correct
circuit the composition of the resulting polynomials, Q(X,D) ·D + R(X,D) should
result in the dividend X, with variables of D eliminated. This is an ultimate test if
the circuit correctly implements the divider.
One possible way to accomplish this is to generate the polynomial Sigout = D ·Q+
R expressed in terms of the respective bits of Q,R,D, and rewrite it all the way to
the primary inputs (PI). The resulting Sigin should produce a polynomial in bits of X
only, representing the dividend. An alternative approach would be to express Q and
R separately, each in their own bits, rewrite them to the PI, and then compose the
resulting signatures as Sigin = Sigin(Q)·D+Sigin(R). The result for a correct circuit
should also be X, with D eliminated. Our initial experiments, however, suggest that
these methods, when applied directly to the entire circuit, are inefficient, since the
size of the intermediate polynomials becomes prohibitively large.
To address this problem, we developed a layered technique, which rewrites each
row corresponding to one bit qi of the quotient, one row at a time. In this case, the
output signature is qiD + Pi, where Pi is the intermediate (partial) remainder, with
the boundary condition P0 = R. The expected input signature of row i is Pi+1, and
Pn = X, where n is the number of (fractional) bits of R,Q and D.
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Figure 5.3: Single layer of the restoring divider used in rewriting.
This approach can be justified by observing that the logic between two adjacent
rows will not be optimized by a synthesis tool and the partial remainder signals are
preserved during synthesis (refer to Theorem 2 of [22]). Synthesis tools, such as
Synopsys DC, typically apply the maintain hierarchy directive, which is beneficial
for physical synthesis. The circuit is synthesized across the add/sub modules of each
layer, but not vertically across the rows.
Let Pi denote a partial remainder associated with the row corresponding to the
quotient bit qi (starting with i = 0). At the bottom of the array, P0 = R, the final
remainder; and at the top of the array, Pn = X, the dividend. Rewriting starts
at the remainder output R and rewrites one row of the add/subtract circuitry at a
time, using one bit of the quotient qi and the entire divisor D to compute the partial
remainder Pi. That is,







iPi,(i+k), where Pi,j denotes a bit of partial re-
mainder in row i, column j = i+ k, with the following boundary conditions:
P0,k = Rk (k = 0,. . . ,n-1 ); Pi,n+i = 0 (i = 0,. . . ,n); Pn,k = Xk (k = n,. . . ,2n). Hence,
at each level (row) i, we have




After n steps, the expected signature of the divider is X.
Figure 5.4: Restoring integer divider [40].
To illustrate the idea, the following rewriting is applied to the restoring divider
shown in Figure 4.7.
q0D + 4R2 + 2R1 +R0 = 8P13 + 4P12 + 2P11 +X0
2q1D + 8P13 + 4P12 + 2P11 = 16P24 + 8P23 + 4P22 + 2X1
4q2D + 16P24 + 8P23 + 4P22 = 16X4 + 8X3 + 4X2
By adding the above equations, we obtain:
(4q2 + 2q1 + q0) ·D + (4R2 + 2R1 +R0) =
16X4 + 8X3 + 4X2 + 2X1 +X0 = X
or, equivalently Q · D + R = X, which is the ultimate proof that the circuit is a
divider.
In this approach, the input signature computed for a given layer becomes an
output signature for the next layer. Such a layered rewriting approach significantly
speeds up the verification process and avoids the problem of a potential memory
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explosion, especially when there is a bug in the circuit. Furthermore, the method
enables debugging by observing the signature at each rewriting step. If the result of
local rewriting does not match the polynomial representing the partial remainder,
Pi, we conclude that the bug exists in the current layer. This process can be easily
done in a speculative parallel manner, since the form of each polynomial at the row
boundary is known, and can be stopped when one of the layers does not produce the
expected result. The source of error is then constrained to the particular layer and
the propagation of rewriting will stop there to examine the bug. The same procedure
can be used to prove the nonrestoring dividers.
5.3 Results
The verification technique described here was implemented in the ABC environ-
ment as a rewriting command &polyn. The experiments were conducted on a 64-bit
Intel Core i7-7600 CPU, 2.80 GHz × 2, with 31 GB of memory. The circuits were gen-
erated by an in-house restoring divider generator tool and synthesized onto standard
cells by the Synopsys Design Compiler (DC).
Table 6.3 shows the results for two verification methodologies: one, for fully rewrit-
ing the entire circuit, which (as explained earlier) does not offer promising results;
and the other based on the layered verification described in this paper. The results
are also compared against: 1) An exhaustive simulation using Modelsim 10.5b on
an Intel Core i7, 2.2 GHz with 16 GB memory; and 2) Equivalence checking using
miniSAT. For the SAT experiment, the synthesized divider circuits are compared
against the dividers instantiated by the Synopsys DesignWare (DW) library. As one
can see from the table, neither the simulation nor the SAT results can compete with
the layered verification. While the time of 780 sec for a 21-bit restoring divider seems
excessive compared to those presented in [22], it gives the time to verify the function
of the divider circuit against its functional specification. This is a significantly harder
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task than checking its equivalence w.r.t. a reference design, especially when both the
circuit under verification and the reference design exhibit similar structure.
Table 5.1: Verification results for a bug-free restoring divider. #Bits = Dividend
bit-width. MO = Memory-out 20 GB, TO = Time-out 3600 s









5 201 0.08 0.01 0.45 0.14
7 352 4.78 0.01 0.97 0.24
11 415 MO 0.01 1.23 10.68
13 570 MO 0.01 8.3 19.16
17 970 MO 4.72 552.5 1584.32
19 1207 MO 51.7 TO TO
21 1470 MO 780 TO TO
23 1750 MO MO TO TO
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter presented a verification method for gate-level integer divider circuits
based on algebraic rewriting. The verification relies on creating a ”reverse divider
unit” that defines the output signature needed for algebraic rewriting. This approach
can, in principle, be used for the entire circuit, or be applied to individual layers of the
divider circuit in the array architecture. It has been shown that the same approach
can be used for fractional arithmetic, since the integer and fractional dividers share
the same architecture.
A notable advantage of this method is that it verifies the divider against its func-
tional specification and does not require a reference circuit. As such, it can be used
to prove newly developed architectures and certify them as reference (golden model);
alternatively, it can be used for designs that do not have a well defined or trusted
reference. The layered technique can be easily parallelized and applied to other arith-
metic circuits with similar architectures. It also enables debugging of the circuit at
the single-layer granularity.
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The algebraic rewriting advocated in this work provides an efficient method for
verifying multipliers, adders, subtractors, and multiply-accumulate circuits. However,
the method is not scalable for the verification of divider circuits, because of their
”non-standard” characteristic function, X = Q · D + R, which is not a closed-form
expression. Specifically, input X is expressed in terms of outputs and another input
D, which, combined with its non-linearity, limits the efficacy of the rewriting. As a
result, dividers do not benefit from rewriting as a means of verification.
In order to learn how to overcome this limitation and devise a method for efficient
verification, we digress for a moment and look at a class of arithmetic circuits similar
to that of divider, but with a different and an easier to handle characteristic function.
In the next chapter, we consider a square-root array circuits (SQRT) that belongs to
the same iterative/subtract architecture family as divider, with a characteristic func-
tion X = Q2 +R. It has a single input X and outputs (Q,R), which provides a clean
output signature, Sigout = Q
2 + R, containing only the output terms. We analyze
the architecture of such circuits and present another original method to verify large
bit-width SQRT circuits, avoiding the limitation of the standard algebraic rewriting




SQUARE-ROOT AND DIVIDER CIRCUIT
VERIFICATION USING HARDWARE REWRITING
Square-root algorithm plays a major role in many domains, including computer
arithmetic, computational geometry, embedded systems, and other special purpose
applications. It belongs to the class of dividers and it is one of the most complex arith-
metic operation to implement and verify [25]. Square-root computation of a positive
number has numerous applications, including Euclidean Norm as well as in the gener-
alizations of the Hilbert Spaces. It defines an important concept of standard-deviation
(root of a variance), and has a major application in quadratic formula to compute
roots for quadratic equations and fields [29][33]. In this chapter, we first present a
verification methodology for square-root circuits using standard rewriting, and then
introduce a new concept of HardwareRewriting , and then extend it to divider.
6.1 Characteristic Function of Square-Root
In order to apply algebraic rewriting to the SQRT circuit, we need to define the
input and output signatures for the circuit and the characteristic function of the
square rooter. The obvious inputs and outputs of such a circuit are X (the radicand)
and Q (the root). The characteristic function of the SQRT operation, Q =
√
X, can
then be described by:
X = Q2 +R, with R ≤ 2Q (6.1)
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where R is the remainder (or residue).1 The remainder R is needed in the expression
so that the arithmetic function of the circuit can be represented as a strict equality
(characteristic function) rather than an approximation. Its role in Equation (6.1) is
similar to that in the division, X = QD+R, where Q is the quotient, D the divisor,
and R the remainder. Depending on the square-root extraction algorithm imple-
mented by the circuit, the remainder R can be positive (in the restoring algorithm)
or of any sign (in the non-restoring algorithm). Using a simple integer example with
X = 13, the solution to Q =
√
(13) ≈ 3.6055 can be either Q = 3 and R = 4; or
Q = 4 and R = −3. Typically, R > 0 is preferred as a standard solution, but nega-
tive remainders can also be used, depending on the required precision (as explained
in more detail in Section 6.2.1.) However, it is important to note that in both cases,
equation (6.1) is satisfied: X = Q2 +R = 32 + 4 = 42 − 3 = 13.
Unfortunately, most hardware SQRT implementations do not provide the remain-
der, so it needs to be generated for the purpose of our verification approach. Section
6.4.1 describes how such a remainder is generated and used in the verification.
6.2 Integer vs. Fractional SQRT
Consider an integer SQRT circuit, with radicand X and root Q being integers. To
verify the SQRT circuit, we need to prove that the equation X = Q2 +R is satisfied
for every input assignment and that R ≤ 2Q. It can be shown that R is also integer
and result Q is unique. Furthermore, for the restoring algorithm, R is positive.
In principle, verification of X = Q2 + R can be achieved by performing algebraic
rewriting discussed in Section 3.1, by rewriting Sigout = Q
2 +R at the outputs Q,R,
into Sigin = X at the input X. The word-level symbols X,Q,R are represented as
polynomials in binary variables (bits) with integer coefficients 2i. Specifically, for n+1
1The reason for the requirement R ≤ 2Q is that for R ≥ 2Q+1, we have X = Q2 +R ≥ (Q+1)2,
hence the result would be incorrect [33].
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iqi, and R =
∑n
i=0 2
iri. We will return to the
verification of the requirement R ≤ 2Q later in Section 6.4.2.
It has been shown in the literature on computer arithmetic [29] and [33] that the
integer SQRT circuit will also perform the SQRT function with the fractional radicand
X and root Q. In fact both circuits use exactly the same algorithm and the same
architecture. Such fractional circuits are routinely used for floating point calculations
and hence it is important to develop a method for their verification. The two designs
will only differ in the representation of the operand X and the result Q, with the




similarly for Q. In the fractional case, the number of bits of R is 2n+1. The radicand




where x0 is the most significant bit and x−n the least significant bit; and similarly for
Q and R.
To avoid fractional coefficients, the fractional representation of X and Q can be
simply multiplied by 2n, where n is an even number of bits (n = 2k) of X and Q.
That is, √






This simple normalization gives us the right to apply the algebraic rewriting concept
(as well as the hardware rewriting developed later) to fractional SQRT circuits using
polynomials with positive coefficients.
6.2.1 Restoring vs Nonrestoring SQRT Verification
We close this section by making remarks about the application of our approach
to all versions of SQRT designs, including integer and fractional, both restoring and
nonrestoring.
We illustrate this point with the following example:
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Q = 86/64 = 1.010110;R = 156/642 = 0.000010011100.
Equation (6.1) is satisfied: X = (86/64)2 + 156/642 = 118/64
• Fractional Nonrestoring:
Without correction,
Q = 87/64 = 1.010111, R = −17/642 = 1.111111101111
and Equation (6.1) is satisfied:
X = (87/64)2 − 17/642 = 118/64
With correction:
Q = 86/64 = 1.010110, R = 156/642 = 0.000010011100
In this case Equation (6.1) is also satisfied: X = (86/64)2 + 156/642 = 118/64.
This result is obtained by rounding down (truncating) the initial result, while
the original one without correction (with R = −17/642) is actually closer to
the real solution and may be more desirable. In any case, regardless of the
correction or rounding, the characteristic equation X = Q2 + R is satisfied





(01110110)2, with Q = 1010 = (1010)2 and
R = 18 = (10010)2, also satisfies Equation (6.1).
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6.3 SQRT Verification Technique
Figure 6.1 shows a 7-bit modular square-root circuit architecture with the two
outputs, Q and R. The basic components of the circuit are the Controlled-Subtract
CS and CR blocks. Here, CS is basically a half-subtractor and CR a full-subtractor
(similar to a half adder and a full adder). The circuit has an iterative-subtract
architecture composed of a number of blocks organized in an iterative fashion: each
row computes a single bit of Q on the left, and the partial remainder R that is fed
to the lower row. To verify the SQRT design, we need to prove that the equation
X = Q2 +R is satisfied for every input assignment. The word-level symbols X,Q,R











Figure 6.1: A restoring SQRT circuit with a 7-bit radicand, 4-bit quotient, and a 5-bit
remainder.
In this chapter, we consider an integer SQRT circuit. However, it has been shown
in [29] that exactly the same architecture will also perform the SQRT function on a
fractional SQRT circuit. This is similar to the case of the divider as already shown
in Section 5.2. The two designs will only differ in the representation of the input and
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the results, with the fractional circuit having representation X = [0.x1....xn−1] and in
the integer case as X = [xn−1....x0]; and similarly for Q and R.
The internal working of the SQRT circuit is similar to the divider: it uses iterative
subtraction, except that the divisor is changing at each step. We can therefore apply
the verification approach used in the divider verification, by rewriting the output
signature Q2 +R to the input X.
To test this idea, we generated a square root circuit with outputs Q,R using the
ABC tool [31], so that the equation X = Q2 +R should hold for a correct circuit.
Figure 6.2: A restoring SQRT circuit with a 4-bit radicand, 2-bit quotient, and a 3-bit
remainder.
For example, the circuit with a 4-bit radicand X and a 2-bit quotient, Q, as shown
in Figure 6.2, has the following output signature:
Sigout = (2q1 + q0)(2q1 + q0) + (8r3 + 4r2 + 2r1 + r0), (6.2)
which in a reduced form is
Sigout = (4q1 + 4q0q1 + q0) + (8r3 + 4r2 + 2r1 + r0). (6.3)
This signature is then rewritten to the outputs, with expected expression being:
Sigin = (8X3 + 4X2 + 2X1 +X0) = X (6.4)
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While conceptually the verification can be accomplished by algebraic rewriting
described by Equations 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4, the resulting Sigin can still be too complex
or the computation may not terminate. To address this problem, we reconstruct the
circuit by explicitly creating the circuit that computes the residual R. The recon-
structed part is obtained by generating the residue circuit R = X−Q2, whose inputs
are X,Q and output is R, further explained in Section 6.4.1. The reconstructed cir-
cuit is shown in red in the upper-right part of Figure 6.5. At this point the rewriting
could potentially be done on the circuit with the original output Q and the newly
generated R. However, such a ”standard” rewriting is not efficient, mostly because
the output signature Sigout = Q
2 +R is nonlinear and the intermediate polynomials
can become prohibitively large causing memory overload.
Table 6.1 shows the verification runtime for the square-root restoring architec-
ture, using the rewriting tool originally developed for multipliers and also applied to
dividers [54]. As expected, the designs with a radicand greater than 8 bits cannot
be verified with this na¨ıve approach due to memory issue. The non-linear signature
(Q2 + R) causes the intermediate polynomial to become so large that the rewriting
does not converge even with 22 GB of memory. The next section describes an original
method to fix this problem.
Table 6.1: Square Root verification results using standard-Style rewriting







Currently, as can be seen from the preliminary results, the memory explosion
during the rewriting process prevents the verification to succeed for large bit-width
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circuits. In order to overcome this issue, a novel concept of hardware-based rewriting
is introduced next.
6.4 Hardware Rewriting for SQRT Verification
6.4.1 Remainder Generation
We now come to the critical issue: in order to prove the circuit using equation
X = Q2 + R, we need the remainder R. However, a typical SQRT circuit provides
only a single output Q. To solve this problem, we restore the ”missing” residual
output by constructing a circuit Rref = X −Q2ref , with inputs X and Qref , and the
needed output Rref , as shown in Figure 6.3. Input Qref is provided by the reference
SQRT design, labeled Ref
√
X in the figure, a golden model known to be correct.
Figure 6.3: Residue generation using a Reference Design.
The reconstructed circuit is shown in Figure 6.4. At this point the rewriting can
be done on the modified circuit with the original output Q and the newly generated
Rref . However, such a simple-minded, standard rewriting is not efficient, mostly
because the output signature Sigout = Q
2 + Rref is nonlinear and the intermediate
polynomials can become prohibitively large. Our experiments show that the designs
with a radicand greater than 8 bits cannot be verified with this approach due to a
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memory overload. The main culprit seems to be the non-linearity of the signature
(Q2 + R), which causes the intermediate polynomial to grow fast, so the rewriting
does not converge even with 22 GB of memory.
Figure 6.4: Conceptual standard rewriting.
The failure of applying algebraic rewriting is actually not surprising; algebraic
rewriting has been successfully applied to complex adders and multipliers, which are
characterized by a linear output signature in its output bits zi, determined by the
encoding of the output bits. For example, a multiplier Z = A ·B has a clearly defined
linear signature Sigout = Z =
∑n−1
i=0 2
izi. However, the square-root circuit has a
non-linear signature, X = Q2 + R. Rewriting a non-linear signature is much more
memory intensive, as demonstrated above, and a standard algebraic rewriting proves
largely ineffective for these circuits.
The reader may ask at this point, and rightly so: ”why not compare Qref directly
to output Q of the design under verification”? In fact we tried it using SAT technique,
but the results were very disappointing, as shown in Table 6.2 Section 6.6. The next
section describes an original method to solve this problem by extending algebraic
rewriting to synthesis to be performed directly on the hardware.
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6.4.2 Hardware Rewriting
We now introduce the concept of a Signature Linearizer, a circuit that transforms
a nonlinear signature Q2+Rref into a linear one, in an attempt to enable the rewriting.
Figure 6.5: Hardware rewriting
Figure 6.5 shows the basic concept of our approach. The upper part of the figure
is the circuit that computes Q2 + Rref described earlier and shown in Figure 6.4.
Since algebraic rewriting of such a polynomial is inefficient, we introduce another
circuit that computes function Z = Q2 + Rref , derived from the output Q of the
original circuit, and the reference remainder Rref , generated from the reference Qref .





As shown in Figure 6.5, the combined circuit has input X and output Z, which
for the correct SQRT circuit should satisfy Z = X. In principle, this equivalence
could be checked by algebraic rewriting of the linear polynomial Z all the way to
the primary inputs, in an attempt to obtain X. However, it turns out that such
an algebraic rewriting is still inefficient, since the internal polynomials can become
prohibitively large.
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Instead, we perform an implicit hardware rewriting by resynthesizing the entire
circuit that computes Z as a function ofX. This resynthesis process uses a state-of-the
art synthesis tool, ABC [31], that includes structural and functional hashing (strash),
functional simplifications (fraig), and a final resynthesis step (dch), all using an AIG
data structure. In a functionally correct SQRT circuit, the newly constructed circuit
should become redundant and reduced to a set of wire connections between X and
Z, provided that the added parts (residue generator R = X −Q2 and the linearizer,
Z = Q2 +R) are correct.
We cannot, however, rely on resynthesis as a formal proof; if the synthesis does
not simplify the design to a redundant state (wires/buffers), we cannot conclude
that the circuit is incorrect. In this case, those portions of the circuit that are not
reduced to wires can be verified using SAT. Specifically, for each bit Zi that does not
trivially reduce to Xi, we create an XOR/miter and check if the result is unSAT (or,
equivalently if the output of an XOR for each pair of bits Xi, Zi is 0).
If the result is unSAT, the circuit is correct; otherwise, the SAT solution provides
a counter example that can be used to identify the bug. This ”hardware rewriting”
idea is illustrated in Figure 6.6.
It should be emphasized that this verification method is sound only if all parts
of the circuit, including the added residual and linearizer circuits, are functionally
correct. If the result is unSAT, one may safely conclude that the added circuits are
correct as well. The chance of the add-ons being faulty in such a way that they
mask the error in the original SQRT circuit is highly unlikely. On the other hand,
the presence of an error in any part of the circuit will result in a satisfiable solution
to the SAT problem, and it wouldn’t be clear if the error comes from the tested
circuit or from the added components. However, correctness of these ”add-ons” is
guaranteed by construction: first the reference remainder, Rref , is constructed from
a reference result Qref of a golden reference SQRT circuit. Then the linearizer circuit
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Z = Q2+Rref is obtained using some golden (certified) squarer Q
2 or a multiplier Q·Q
of input Q, and a golden adder that adds Q2 to Rref . In this case, a satisfiable solution
will correctly indicate that the SQRT circuit is faulty, avoiding false negatives.
Figure 6.6: Final verification using SAT: check if ∀i,Xi = Zi.
Similar argument applies to verifying the constraint R ≤ 2Q in equation (6.1),
since the circuit for Rref in Figure 6.3 is derived from a correct reference design Qref .
If this constraint is not satisfied by the SQRT under verification, the output Q of the
circuit in conjunction with the correct reference remainder Rref would not match X.
The results shown in Section 6.6 demonstrate that our methodology works well
on both bug-free and buggy designs. Finding a source of a bug and performing the
debugging is a separate and challenging problem, which will be considered in future
work.
6.5 Divider Verification
In this section, we analyze a typical architecture of an arithmetic divider. Its
internal structure is similar to that of a SQRT circuit (both are based on a standard
shift and subtract algorithm), except that here the divisor D remains fixed during
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each shift/subtract iteration. The division can also be based on a restoring or a
non-restoring algorithm, as in SQRT. The essential difference between the two, how-
ever, comes from their mathematical model, the characteristic function used in the
verification. Specifically, SQRT function Q =
√
X has a simple closed-form formula
X = Q2 + R, with the input operand X on the left-hand side of the equation and
the outputs Q,R on the right, as developed in Section 6.3. In this case, the output
signature is clearly defined as (Q2 + R), and can be directly used in the algebraic
or hardware rewriting. In contrast, the characteristic function of a divider is more
complex, as it is governed by the following equation:
X = D ·Q+R, with R < D (6.5)
where X is the dividend, D the divisor, and Q,R the quotient and remainder, re-
spectively. Note that the right-hand side of the equation, in addition to the outputs
Q,R also contains the input D; that is, the inputs X,D appear on both sides of the
equation. This makes it difficult to determine what the output signature is, hence
questioning the very algebraic rewriting approach advocated here. To address this
issue, we propose the method in [49], which considers the entire right-hand side of
Equation (6.5), including the input D, as the output signature and attempts to ver-
ifies if it reduces to X. The remainder of this section describes how to effect this
verification.
Figure 6.7: Divider verification model.
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Figure 6.8: Restoring integer: divider [40]; a) Layered architecture b) Single layer
used in rewriting [48].
6.5.1 Verification Model: SAT-based vs Algebraic Rewriting
Figure 6.7 shows an abstract model of the divider verification employed in this
work. The upper part of the diagram is the divider under verification. The lower box
”reverses” the division X/D by computing Q·D + R from the quotient Q and the
remainder R, produced by the divider. The goal is to prove that the computed result
matches the original dividend X, i.e. X = Q·D + R, and the condition that R < D
is satisfied.
One can solve this problem by creating a circuit Y = Q·D + R and checking the
equivalence between its output Y and the dividend X. In principle, this can be done
using a standard SAT technique: create a miter between the dividend input X and
output Y = QD + R of the circuit and check if the CNF formula of the resulting
miter circuit is unsatisfiable (unSAT). As a proof of concept, we tested this method
on both restoring and non-restoring array dividers using the ABC system [31], with
MiniSAT [44] as the underlying SAT engine. The solution required only 4.4 seconds
to prove a 16-bit X with a 8-bit D divisor, but the computation timed out after 3600
sec for larger instances. Dividers with dividend bit-widths greater than 16 bits could
not be verified using this method.
Another approach is to use algebraic rewriting, described in Section 3.1. It uses
polynomial (QD + R) as the output signature and transforms by rewriting all the
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way to the primary inputs X of the divider. However, as shown in Section 4.4.5, this
technique is still inefficient and suffers from high memory complexity. To address this
problem, a layered rewriting technique, described earlier in Section 5.2.3 has been
briefly described in the next section for convenience.
6.5.2 Layered Algebraic Rewriting
Layered rewriting is a technique of algebraic rewriting applied to each row (layer)
associated with a singe output bit qi of the divider; refer to Figure 6.8a). The layered
approach can be justified by noting that the logic between two adjacent rows is typi-
cally not optimized during synthesis and the partial remainder signals are preserved
during synthesis (Theorem 2 of [22]). Synthesis tools, such as Synopsys DC, allow IC
designers to impose a maintain hierarchy directive to make physical synthesis more
efficient. Even if the design is optimized during synthesis, one can revert the changes
by using data contained in the setup verification file (e.g., SVF, maintaned by Syn-
opsys DC). The circuits can be synthesized across the add/sub modules of each layer,
but not vertically across the rows.
We explain the layered approach for an architecture of the divider circuit with 2n+ 1
bits of X and n+ 1 bits of D,Q and R, as shown in Figure 6.8a). Algebraic rewriting
is applied to each layer corresponding to one bit qi at a time. Let Pi denote a partial
remainder associated with the row corresponding to the quotient bit qi (starting with
i = 0). At the bottom of the array, P0 = R, the final remainder; and at the top of the
array, Pn = X, the dividend. The output signature for a given layer is qiD + Pi, and
the expected input signature of row i is Pi+1, with the boundary condition Pn = X,
where n is the number of (fractional) bits of R,Q and D.
Rewriting starts at the remainder output R and rewrites one row of the add/subtract
circuitry at a time. The input signature computed for a given layer becomes an output
signature for the next layer. Specifically,
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kdk, and Pi =
∑n
k=0 2
kPi,(i+k). Here Pi,j denotes a bit of the
partial remainder Pi in row i and column j = i + k, with the following boundary
conditions:
P0,k = Rk(k = 0,. . . ,n-1)
Pi,n+i = 0(i = 0,. . . ,n)
Pn,k = Xk(k = n,. . . ,2n).
Hence, at each layer i, we have
2i(qiD + Pi) = 2
i+1Pi+1 + 2
iXi.
After n steps, the expected signature of the divider is X. To illustrate the idea, the
following rewriting is applied to the restoring divider shown in Figure 6.8.
q0D + 4R2 + 2R1 +R0 = 8P13 + 4P12 + 2P11 +X0
2q1D + 8P13 + 4P12 + 2P11 = 16P24 + 8P23 + 4P22 + 2X1
4q2D + 16P24 + 8P23 + 4P22 = 16X4 + 8X3 + 4X2
By adding the above equations, we obtain:
(4q2 + 2q1 + q0) ·D + (4R2 + 2R1 +R0) = 16X4 + 8X3 + 4X2 + 2X1 +X0
or, equivalently QD +R = X, which proves that the circuit is a divider.
Such a layered rewriting approach significantly speeds up the verification process and
partially avoids the problem of a potential memory explosion, which can be especially
severe in the presence of a bug. Furthermore, it enables debugging by observing the
signature at each rewriting step. If the result of local rewriting does not match the
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polynomial representing the partial remainder, Pi, we conclude that the current layer
contains a bug. This process can also be done in a speculative, parallel manner, since
the form of each polynomial at the row boundary is known, and can be stopped when
one of the layers does not produce the expected result. This way the source of an
error is constrained to a particular layer and the propagation of rewriting will stop
there to examine the bug. The same procedure can be used to prove non-restoring
dividers.
However, such a layered algebraic rewriting is still non-scalable and fails for circuits
with dividends beyond 21 bits. The next section proposes a method to remedy the
problem by applying the idea of hardware-based rewriting described in Section 6.4 to
array dividers.
6.5.3 Layered Hardware Rewriting
The concept of hardware rewriting, initially introduced in the context of the SQRT
circuits in Section 6.4, can be extended to array dividers by applying it to individual
layers of the array divider. The main idea is to add a circuit that reverses the com-
putation of a partial remainder implemented in a given layer i from its output Pi and
the given bit of the quotient, qi. The circuit is termed a signature linearizer, since its
output signature can be represented as a multi-linear polynomial. Figure 6.9 shows
a single layer appended with such a linearizer circuit which computes Dqi + Pik. For
simplicity it is shown here for the bottom layer, i = 0. The linearizer simply cre-




kz0k. This technique of layered hardware rewriting is much more efficient
and scalable compared to all other techniques mentioned so far, verifying dividers of
up-to 127-bit in just 19 seconds, shown in Section 6.6.2.
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Figure 6.9: Layered hardware rewriting for dividers.
6.5.4 Verifying Output Constraint, R < D
For the verification of a divider to be complete, one must also verify that the
remainder and the divisor satisfy the constraint R < D (integer case) and D 6= 0.
It should be emphasized that this constraint applies to the integer divider circuits in
which the bit-widths of all the operands, X,D, and the outputs, Q,R, are the same,
as in Figure 6.8(a). However, for the divider with size of D,Q,R being roughly half
(n+1 bits) of that of the dividend X (2n+1 bits) an additional user constraint must
be imposed on the dividend vs divisor, namely X < 2nD, or equivalently D > 2−nX,
in order to avoid overflow of the quotient Q [29] . Similarly, for the case of frac-
tional divider the constraint on the inputs is X < D, for otherwise the result would
not be fractional. These constraints must be taken into account during verification,
otherwise the result cannot be correctly verified. Here, we describe the solution to
the integer case, where X,D,Q,R all have the same bit-width, in which case the
constraint on the inputs is simply X > D > 0. Later, we present the solution for the
constraint verification for the layered architecture as well.
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The basic idea of the proposed verification of this constraint is shown in Figure
6.10. The goal is to check if the constraint R < D is always satisfied by the circuit.
This is done by appending the circuit with a comparator, z = (R ≥ D) and syn-
thesizing the resulting circuit. Its output evaluates to 1 if the condition R ≥ D is
satisfied, or, equivalently when R < D is not satisfied. In addition we also consider
the case of divider value D = 0, which should be disallowed. The condition D 6= 0
needs to be checked, otherwise X = DQ + R makes R = X, which for an unsigned
integer divider clearly violates the condition R < D. This condition is coded using
signal Divby0, which indicates if D = 0; such a signal is provided by the circuit (as in
the case of Synopsys DesignWare) or can be derived directly from the input D. The
combined goal is now to prove that
(R < D) ∧ (D 6= 0)
is satisfied or, equivalently, if
(R ≥ D) ∨ (D = 0) (6.6)
is unsatisfiable (unSAT). The resulting hardware (gate-level netlist) of such con-
structed circuit is converted to the CNF format and subjected to SAT. If the solution
is unsatisfiable, unSAT, this proves that the constraint R < D and D 6= 0 holds. We
tested this idea on dividers with dividends up to 21 bits using ABC tool [31] and con-
firmed the validity of this approach. Unfortunately, the constraint verification for a
complete divider design could not be completed for dividends with bit-widths beyond
21 bits. In particular, we could not verify R < D on a 32-bit Synopsys DW divider
design via this SAT method; the experiment timed out in 3600 seconds; specific in-
formation is given in the results Section 6.6 in Table 6.4. In the following section, we
propose a method to solve the problem for large dividers using case-splitting.
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Figure 6.10: Verifying condition R < D of a complete divider.
6.5.5 Verifying constraint R < D by Case Splitting
To make the problem manageable, we divide it into sub-problems and verify the
constraint (6.6) using SAT approach for individual ranges of D, each of them being
sufficiently small for the SAT to handle. It suffices to only impose a case on D. This is
accomplished by appending the divider circuit with a comparator R ≥ D and applying
it to individual ranges of D. For instance, when verifying the constraint for a 32-bit
divider, we split the process into four cases. The first case verifies the range of D ≤ 28
by adding a constraint (another comparator) which imposes this restriction. This
restriction is appended with the restrictions on R,D discussed above, the resulting
circuit is synthesized and subjected to a satisfiability test (SAT), as shown in Figure
6.11. Similar test needs to be performed for each range of D.
The range splitting of D makes the constraint verification tractable. Without
this casing strategy, the SAT problem is complex and for the case of 32-bit Synopsys
DW divider the SAT verification times out after 3600s, as shown in Section 6.5.4.
By splitting the verification into multiple cases, the constraint verification is reduced
to take only a couple of seconds for dividends up-to 64-bits. The designer has to
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Figure 6.11: Verifying condition R < D of a complete divider using case-splitting
strategy for a given range of D.
decide what granularity to choose for case-splitting, depending on the number of core
processors and the number of jobs that can run simultaneously. For the 32-bit divider
constraint verification, we split the verification into four cases.
6.5.6 Constraint Verification for Layered Divider
While, in principle, the case splitting strategy for constraint verification simplifies
the problem, the complete verification of the divider functionality and R < D con-
straint still does not scale, as shown later in Table 6.4. To address this issue, we adopt
the layered approach, described in Section 6.5.3, and apply the constraint analysis to
the individual layers of the divider. In this case we also need to take care of the
bounds on X and D, such as X < 2nD, to address the overflow issue. To do this,
we add another comparator to the design to implement the constraint of X < 2nD.
This approach is illustrated in Figure 6.12.
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Figure 6.12: Verifying condition R < D for the layered verification strategy, layer 0,
using case-splitting
Table 6.2: Verification run times for SQRT circuits. #Bits = Radicand bit-width;
MO = Memory-out 20GB; TO = Time-out 3600s



















6 78 1.93 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.06
12 381 MO 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.06
18 897 MO 0.13 1.9 0.04 0.11 0.01 0.15 0.16
24 1584 MO 2.37 115 0.10 0.24 0.02 0.36 0.38
32 2794 MO 146.9 TO 0.77 1.06 0.02 1.85 1.91
64 10994 MO TO TO 1.70 6.07 0.02 7.79 7.85
96 24570 MO TO TO 3.78 6.88 0.95 11.61 8.26
128 43522 MO TO TO 6.43 10.26 2.92 19.52 21.10
256 263377 MO TO TO 9.81 73.53 983.33 1067.3 91.42
6.6 Results
6.6.1 SQRT Circuits
The verification technique described in this paper was implemented in Python and
C++ as a stand-alone program, which uses ABC [2] at the back-end for synthesis. The
program was tested on a number of SQRT circuits with radicand bit-widths varying
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from 6 to 256. The square-root circuits used in the experiments were generated from
Synopsys DWare library with the add-ons (the residual circuit and the linearizer)
generated using the ABC tool [2]. Each design was appended with a residual circuit
and a linearizer, and synthesized using ABC (strash, dfraig , dch). It should be pointed
out that the architecture of the tested SQRT circuits and the add-ons generated by
ABC are different and do not exhibit structural similarities, which proves the efficiency
of our technique.
In the experiments, circuits with radicands smaller than 24 bits were synthesized
down to bare wires, proving that the circuit indeed performs a SQRT function. The
larger circuit, beyond 24 bits, required formal verification using SAT.
Table 6.2 compares the verification time of our technique with those obtained with
the following techniques: 1) standard rewriting; 2) SAT (used for equivalence checking
between Synopsys DW circuits and the reference design generated by ABC); and 3)
simulation. The SAT experiments (column 4) were performed by creating a miter
between the SQRT circuit and a reference design obtained from Synopsys DesignWare
library and ABC tool respectively. The test for satisfiability was performed using
miniSAT [44]. Despite its renown efficiency, miniSAT was unable to handle circuits
with radicand bit-widths greater than 32. Similarly, standard algebraic rewriting of [9]
(col 3) could not verify designs beyond 8-bit radicands because of memory overload;
it used over 22 GB of memory in a matter of minutes.
The table also shows CPU time required for all phases of our experiment, includ-
ing: the residue generation (col. 6); resynthesis (col. 7); and hardware-rewrite SAT
to prove hardware rewriting (col. 8). Total verification time is given in column 9. As
we can see from the table, SPEAR outperforms all of the tested techniques.
We also performed experiments on buggy circuits by inserting a number of bugs
(5) in random places in the design. The verification results are shown in the last
column (col. 10) of the table. Experiments show that for buggy circuits, solving
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the satisfiability problem (and hence proving the bug) was easier than proving that
the functionally correct, bug-free circuit is unSAT. This is not surprising, since in
general the unSAT problems are harder to solve (in the worst case the entire solution
space may need to be examined). In addition, the solution provided by SAT provides a
counter-example that can be used to identify the bug. The debugging is a challenging
problem, and it is part of future work.
We also performed exhaustive simulation experiments. The simulation was unable
to handle circuits with more than 24-bit radicand and was aborted after running for
over 10 hours of CPU time and consuming over 10 GB of memory for storing the
intermediate simulation results. In contrast to all these schemes, hardware rewriting
was able to verify square-root designs with up to 256-bit radicands, containing over
260,000 gates in less than 18 minutes, while using less than 4 GB of memory.
Table 6.3: Verification of a bug-free restoring divider. MO = Memory-out 20 GB,















5 201 0.08 0.01 0.45 0.14 - 0.09
7 352 4.78 0.01 0.97 0.24 - 0.12
11 415 MO 0.01 1.23 10.68 - 0.18
13 570 MO 0.01 8.30 19.16 5.30 0.21
17 970 MO 4.72 552.50 1584.32 12.20 0.27
19 1207 MO 51.70 TO TO - 0.40
21 1470 MO 780.00 TO TO - 0.44
23 1750 MO MO TO TO - 0.48
33 3700 MO MO TO TO 24.50 0.68
63 13446 MO MO TO TO 40.50 4.48
95 28200 MO MO TO TO - 12.96
127 51200 MO MO TO TO - 18.56
6.6.2 Divider Circuits
The experiments were conducted on a 64-bit Intel Core i7-7600 CPU, 2.80 GHz
× 2, with 30 GB of memory. The circuits were generated by a restoring divider
generator tool and synthesized onto standard cells by the Synopsys Design Compiler
(DC). The results of our work are stated in column ”This Work”. The consolidated
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results are shown in Table 6.3 and include multiple verification methodologies: 1)
Algebraically rewriting the entire circuit using full-rewrite software [9]; as mentioned
earlier, this method is not effective in divider verification; 2) Based on the proposed
layered verification [48] using layered-rewrite software. Our results are also compared
with: 3) exhaustive simulation using Modelsim 10.5b on an Intel Core i7, 2.2 GHz with
16 GB memory; and 4) equivalence checking using miniSAT. In the SAT experiment,
the synthesized divider circuits were compared against the dividers instantiated by
the Synopsys DesignWare (DW) library. We also compare our results with those in
[22] and show that our tool performs orders of magnitude faster; the results include
the time for constraint verification as well.
As one can see from the table, neither the simulation nor the SAT results can
compete with the layered HR-SAT verification. The seventh column presents the
most scalable to-date divider verification results. The method of [22] relies on a
heavy structural matching and it is only scalable up to 64-bit dividers. The sign ”−”
in some entries shows that the data for that entry was not available from the reference
paper. Our methodology can verify dividers of up to twice the bit-width.
Table 6.4: Detailed analysis of verification of a bug-free restoring divider using
Hardware-based rewriting for Full vs. Layered strategies. MO = Memory-out 20





Hardware Rewrite - Full Divider
Verification Time (s)




Total (s) Re-syn. HR-SAT R < D Total (s)
5 201 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.09
7 352 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.12
11 415 0.80 0.55 0.01 1.36 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.18
13 570 0.89 1.59 0.01 2.49 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.21
17 970 1.10 92.72 0.05 95.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.27
19 1207 1.26 1044.28 0.11 1045.65 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.40
21 1470 - TO 0.14 TO 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.44
23 1750 - TO 0.17 TO 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.48
33 3700 - TO 1.01 TO 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.68
63 13446 - TO 10.06 TO 0.05 0.08 0.01 4.48
95 28200 - TO 1343.00 TO 0.10 0.15 0.02 12.96
127 51200 - TO TO TO 0.11 0.16 0.02 18.56
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Table 6.4 presents the detailed results for this work, showing the verification times
of different stages of the verification process. We also compare the HW-based rewrit-
ing for a full divider vs. layered divider. A Full-Rewrite (hardware) column presents
data for dividers, attempting a complete (non-layered) design verification. The syn-
thesis tools are not powerful enough to remove all redundancies, even after simplify-
ing the design with an appended hardware linearizer, leaving some redundant logic
and making the resulting SAT problem not solvable. In contrast, the layered based
hardware-rewriting is efficient and scalable.
Our methodology not only verifies the functionality of the design, but it also
verifies whether the design satisfies the intrinsic constraint R < D. Column labeled
”R < D” in Table 6.4 (Full Divider) is for the architecture with same bit-widths for
all operands (X,D,Q,R). For the architecture with smaller bit-widths of D,Q,R
than the bit-width of X, such as shown in Figure 6.8, the situation is more complex:
the (seemingly obvious) condition R < D is satisfied only if Q does not overflow,
that is for D > 2−nX [29]. We implemented these constraints as well in the context
of layered rewriting. Since each layer is small compared to the complete design,
functional verification of each layer, as well as verifying the constraints on X,R,D,
is very effective in terms of memory and time complexity. This is done by appending
gate-level comparators for D > 2−nX to each layer to prove that R < D. Our results
for layered-based HR-SAT are shown in the right column of Table 6.4 (Layered).
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY, CONTRIBUTION, AND PUBLICATIONS
It may seem surprising that adding more hardware (Rref , Q
2 + Rref , and lin-
earizers) to the design actually simplifies the verification problem at hand. While
this obviously increases the circuit complexity in terms of the hardware involved, the
resulting circuit, as long as it is bug-free, should become redundant. The described
technique relies on the synthesis and SAT tools to prove this redundancy. As clearly
demonstrated by the experiments, even if the synthesis is unable to reduce the result-
ing, inherently redundant circuit to wires/buffer, the standard SAT-based verification
has a much easier task to prove the equivalence. In particular, SAT can be applied
independently to a single-input logic cone, in parallel, as shown in Figure 6.6.
In principle, since the proposed technique does not depend on the internal struc-
ture of the circuit (or the algorithm it implements), it should also handle other types
of square-root and divider circuits, such as those based on the convergence algorithm
[28]. In general, the described hardware verification technique can be applied to
arithmetic circuits with non-linear polynomial characteristic function. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work that was able to successfully verify large integer
square-root and divider circuits using formal methods.
7.1 Contribution
• Presented an algebraic model for the verification of constant and generic ar-
ray dividers. Introduced an engineering way of verifying layered-based divider
circuits to enhance scalability.
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• Proposed and implemented a novel technique of hardware rewriting for SQRT
circuits. This entails a complete automated verification methodology, including
automatic generation of the residue circuit (for SQRT) and the linearizer circuit,
and their integration with the original circuit, followed by re-synthesis with a
synthesis tool, such as ABC.
• Integrated a reverse-division unit to help perform a ”cleaner” layered rewriting
strategy, as shown in Section 5.1. The layered rewriting makes the rewriting
more efficient, specially for a hardware-based rewriting approach. With this,
one can now verify the dividers with up to 127-bit dividend operand using the
hardware rewriting combined with layered approach.
• Discussed the applicability of the underlying methodology to floating point di-
vider circuits implemented in fractional arithmetic.
• Created an extensive set of benchmarks representative of real industrial designs,
including the instantiated elements of the Design Ware library of Synopsys
Design Compiler (DC). While the Verilog code for these circuits is encrypted,
the optimized gate-level netlists are available and were used for this purpose.
• Implemented python scripts for automating the verification process, including
the netlist conversion between Synopsys DC and ABC tool.
7.1.1 Future Directions
There is a number of interesting research directions, not discussed in this work that
can be further explored to enhance the efficiency and applicability of the proposed
technique to other architectures.
• Apply the verification to arithmetic circuits in fractional arithmetic.
• We demonstrated that hardware rewriting works well for the complete square-
root design, whereas on dividers, we have to rely the layered architecture. We
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analyzed the reason for it, namely the difference in the characteristic function.
However, one can analyze in more detail the gate level logic to try to infer what
makes the rewriting hard. Understanding the architectural difference between
SQRT and DIV presented in this work might help answer this question.
• Explore architectures of SQRT and DIV using hardware rewriting and/or al-
gebraic rewriting. Other arithmetic circuits like modulo arithmetic operation,
iterative subtractors/adders, and other structures might be worth looking into
as well.
• Lastly, for checking algorithmic correctness, loop-invariant equations can be
used to determine the characteristic equations. Once these well-defined equa-
tions are derived, hardware rewriting can be applied for verification.
7.2 Publications
The following research articles have been published over the course of this research.
• Atif Yasin, Tiankai Su, Se´bastien Pillement, Maciej Ciesielski. Verifying
Square-root and Divider Circuits by Hardware Rewriting (Submitted
TCAD2020)
• Atif Yasin, Tiankai Su, Se´bastien Pillement, Maciej Ciesielski. SPEAR: Hardware-
based Implicit Rewriting for Square-root Verification (DATE 2020)
• Atif Yasin, Tiankai Su, Se´bastien Pillement, Maciej Ciesielski. Functional
Verification of Hardware Dividers using Algebraic Model. IFIP/IEEE
International Conference on Very Large Scale Integration VLSI-SOC, Oct 2019,
Cusco, Peru.
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• Atif Yasin, Tiankai Su, Se´bastien Pillement, Maciej Ciesielski. Formal Veri-
fication of Integer Dividers: Division by a Constant. IEEE Symposium
on VLSI (ISVLSI), IEEE, Jul 2019, Miami, USA.
• Cunxi Yu, Atif Yasin, Tiankai Su, Alan Mishchenko, Maciej Ciesielski, Rewrit-
ing Environment for Arithmetic Circuit Verification, 22nd International
Conference on Logic Programming, Artificial Intelligence and Reasoning (LPAR-
22), EPIC Series in Computing, 2018.
• T. Su, A. Yasin, C. Yu and M. Ciesielski, ”Computer Algebraic Approach
to Verification and Debugging of Galois Field Multipliers,” 2018 IEEE
International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), Florence, Italy,
2018.
• M. Ciesielski, T. Su, A. Yasin and C. Yu, ”Understanding Algebraic Rewrit-
ing for Arithmetic Circuit Verification: a Bit-Flow Model,” in IEEE
Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems,
April 2019 (Early Access)
• T. Su, C. Yu, A. Yasin and M. Ciesielski, ”Formal Verification of Truncated
Multipliers Using Algebraic Approach and Re-Synthesis,” 2017 IEEE
Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI), Bochum, Germany,
2017.
• Cunxi Yu, Tiankai Su, Atif Yasin, and Maciej Ciesielski. 2019. Spectral
Approach to Verifying Non-linear Arithmetic Circuits. In Proceedings
of the 24th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference (ASPDAC
’19). ACM, New York, NY, USA.
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